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Final report 
 
 
Overview 
We provide a first empirical assessment of winners and losers in the process of European 
integration, based on a broad view, that aggregates a pure trade perspective, a sectoral 
approach including unit labor cost and productivity analysis, a labor migration 
description and a picture of individual perceptions. Our findings of winners and losers, 
as well as of potential winners and losers, are complemented by policy recommendations, 
which emphasize the need for an active public policy. 
 
Introduction 
 
Integration in the European Union is one of the twin strategic choices of Romania. As a 
matter of fact, this integration is seen as a multiple venue for the Romanian society in its 
quest for economic transformation and modernization. Why the latter is mentioned? For 
economic and social backwardness is a feature of Romania (and of other Eastern 
European societies) which goes back deeply into history, well before the advent of 
communism. Will Romania succeed now, in combining post-communist transformation 
and modernization via its quest for EU integration? This can and should be an obsessive 
question to all of us. Prima facie, the answer cannot be but positive for the EU is a club 
of rich and democratic countries. Admission into the EU would seal the accomplishments 
of a journey of thorough economic and social change. But there is a major distinction to 
make in this respect, namely between the end stage (accession), and integration viewed 
as a gradual process of change of the anatomy and physiology of Romanian society –
which should make it compatible with EU economic and institutional structures. If  the 
emphasis is put on process the issue becomes much more complicated since the candidate 
countries for EU accession are very diverse and Romania is one of the poorest performers 
economically. It does make sense, therefore, to assume that, in her case, the process will 
last longer. 
 
But this inference, on the time dimension of integration, is not the end of the story. 
Integration can be more or less smooth, with a variety of benefits and costs, which hinge 
on the actual advance of transformation in Romania. The more economic progress 
Romania achieves the easier would be for her to fit into the very competitive EU 
environment. And even so, there would be losers: sectors and companies which are likely 
to be forced out of the economic game, with dire consequences for the labor force 
compelled to seek other jobs. Achieving allocative efficiency (reallocation of resources 
from low onto high productivity areas) is not painless in the real world. Moreover, the 
public (economic) policies of Romanian governments – even when these policies take 
cognizance of the need to apply the acquis communataire are not a given; they can vary, 
be better or worse, which means that their effects can be widely different. Some policies 
can enhance integration, other can slow down this process. 
Surprisingly, although EU integration is an historically exceptional process for  
Romanian society, the research linked with the economics of this endeavor is pretty 
scant. The implications are multifarious. And this assertion does not refer to the naked 
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utility of knowledge, but to its supporting function in propping up policy. For this reason,  
we thought it appropriate to start, at The Romanian Center for Economic Policies, a 
research program on this topic. 
 
This paper aims at identifying winners and losers of EU integration1, from the Romanian 
society perspective. On the one hand, our endeavor follows a path already opened by 
other works abroad2 and at home3. On the other hand, this study differs from previous 
attempts on that it combines the social and the economic sides, by relating labor 
movements to trade realities. Our study also presents another novelty in that it shows 
how groups of people perceive EU integration. This is important since, in a democracy, 
perceptions shape popular support for policy. Good or wrong, these perceptions are to be 
taken into account by policy-makers. 
 
In order to attain our goal, there are some facts that we need to clarify from the very 
beginning, as follows: 
 
• The first step in our analysis is to try to define the realities beneath the concepts of 
winners and losers. There is a major remark to be made: the winner/loser 
classification varies depending on the dimension of the analysis. First, the 
winner/loser identification of a sector does not necessarily hold true for each and 
every part of that sector, be it either a firm or an individual. Hence, there could be 
particular winners within a loser sector, and vice versa. Second, the winner/loser 
dichotomy valid for one sector or another does not necessarily correspond to net 
welfare gain/loss at the level of the entire society. Following this line of thought, a 
loser sector can free resources to other sectors of the economy, improving the 
allocative efficiency of the economy as a whole.  
 
• It is always difficult to make a clear distinction between the effects of the integration 
process and those of the normal transition-based reforming process.  We have tried to 
isolate the impact of EU integration from the impact of the transition process; yet, we 
acknowledge that the success was only partial. Our efforts aimed at calculating 
separate revealed comparative advantages indices with the European Union, and with 
the rest of the world, considering the rest of the world situation as a control scenario 
(in the absence of asymmetric trade barriers dismantling); the subjective perceptions 
                                                          
1 We hereby understand integration not stricto senso, as the formal move to join EU, but as a gradual 
process of increasing compatibility with EU economic structures, political institutions and legal 
mechanisms. As formal integration can not be taken for granted, we use the term “integration” to define the 
processes that take place in the pre-accession stage.  
2 Tang, Helena (ed.) Winners and losers of the EU integration EBRD, 2000; Pelkmans, Jacques, Gros, 
Daniel and Ferrer, Jorge Nunez Long-run economic aspects of the European Union’s Eastern enlargement 
WWR working documents, 2000; Richter, Sandor Measurement of costs and benefits of accession to the 
EU for selected CEECs WIIW project, 2000; Custom policy impact of EU integration, The Romanian 
Center for Foreign Trade, 2000. 
3 Munteanu, Costea; Boscaiu, Voicu; Liusnea, Daniela; Puscoi, Lucia The impact of foreign trade and 
direct investments on productivity in the Romanian manufacturing industry. The case of Romania RCEP 
research paper (in Romanian) no. 22/2000. 
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of individuals refer exclusively to the integration process; domestic migration flows 
are complemented by workforce outflows towards EU. 
 
• The winner/loser position is not a given fact, an axiomatic feature that must be taken 
for granted. It is actually the final objective of this paper to give recommendations on 
alternative policies to address, soften, or even counteract, negative impacts entailed 
by the integration process. 
 
Limits of our work are hereby acknowledged as follows: 
• Some inconsistencies in our paper, or lack of relevance of some indicators, might 
appear due to the difficult process of data collection, on one hand, and even the initial 
process of data gathering for the official statistics, on the other hand. 
• The agriculture does not receive the entire attention it deserves, as our analysis is 
rather focused on industrial sectors. Another study should redress this imbalance. 
• Hypothesis are expressed, yet some of them remain to be tested by further research. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology deals with gathering and computing Romania’s foreign trade data for 
the last 10 years, including revealed comparative advantages4, and comparing them with 
those of other accession countries (CEFTA minus Romania). In addition, data on unit 
labor costs, employment and productivity are computed and analyzed together. However, 
we admit the fact that there are other dimensions of illustrating the positions of different 
groups of industries and individuals, than the rather quantitative approach adopted 
hereinafter. As far as the more sensitive part of individual perceptions is regarded, it is 
based on the results of a representative opinion poll. Within this analysis, dominant 
opinion indices are computed in order to describe the symbolic image attached to the 
process of integration by different groups of people5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A brief description of EU-Romania relationships 
 
Romanian authorities’ efforts to join the European Union have evolved within an 
institutionalized framework since February 1993, the date of signing the EU Association 
                                                          
4 We calculate RCA in two ways. First, we look at domestic RCA, meaning what we trade better than the 
average, based on the formula RCA = ln (Xir/Mir) / (Xr/Mr) , where i is a given industry and r a given 
region (it can be eu - European Union, c - CEFTA, r - rest of the world as in total minus EU). These data 
are calculated since 1991. Second, we look at external RCA, meaning what we trade better than others, 
based on the formula RCA = ln (Xir/Xr) / (MRi/MR) - a ratio of the share of iin our country exports to the 
share of the i in the partner region’s imports.  These data are only available for 1999.  For an easier 
understanding, we will refer the first type of RCA as RCAA, and the second one as RCAB.  
5 The dominant opinion index is calculated as DOPI=(P-R)*(100-N)/100, where P-positive answers, R-
rejection answers, N-neutral.  DOPI scores can vary from –100 to +100. 
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Agreement. In June 1995, Romania officially applied for accession into the EU. A first 
assessment on its request was given by the EU in the Agenda 2000, a document adopted 
in July 1997. In December 1999,  the European Council decides to open accession 
negotiations with the so-called “Helsinki group” of six countries, including Romania.  
The year 2000 marks a number of developments in the process of integration.  
 
In terms of a strategic perspective towards EU accession, most important of these events 
was the adoption of The Medium Term Economic Strategy; in terms of technical 
compliance with EU regulations,  most significant event was the actual debut of 
negotiations on specific chapters. Out of a number of 31 negotiations chapters, Romania 
has completed 5, namely: small and medium-sized enterprises; education, training and 
youth; science and research; external relations; common foreign and security policy. Four 
other chapters which have been opened for negotiations are: statistics; culture and audio-
visual; telecommunications and information technology; competition policy. The 
approach taken is to fasten the process by dealing now with rather easy-to-negotiate 
chapters, leaving the sensitive issues, such as agriculture, to be addressed later on. 
 
The latest report (2000) of the European Commission on Romania is tough in several  
respects. Thus corruption is considered widespread, the Parliament is working to slow, 
and the Government’s decisions lack coherence. Regarding the economic criteria, some 
positive results have been noticed (slight economic recovery, increase in exports, 
decrease of the fiscal deficit); however, structural reforms are still lagging and Romania 
is not regarded as a functional market economy. 
 
As far as the adopting the acquis communitaire  is concerned, the report considers that 
Romania has recorded fast improvement on competition laws, trademark and copyright 
legislation,  and transport. Limited progress - the report says - is shown on free 
movement of goods, people and capital, social protection and unemployment policies, 
while there is still significant need for further improvement on agriculture, environment, 
telecommunications, information technology, consumer protection. 
 
The advance of the negotiation process, and the subsequent adoption of the acquis 
communitaire, do not automatically get Romania closer to integration into the EU. This is 
because the gap to be closed is not only a political, legal or technical matter, but first of 
all a development issue. According to World Bank estimates6, Romania needs a steady 
annual growth rate of 4.7% over the next 20 years in order to reduce at 50% the per 
capita income gap with EU average level.  
 
 
2. The individual perspective 
 
The dominant lines of reasoning among people with regard to the EU integration process 
are identified7 on the basis of two questions addressed: Do you consider that Romania, as 
                                                          
6 Progress toward the unification of Europe, a World Bank paper, 2000. 
7 Eurobarometer, April 2000, The Gallup Organization Romania 
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a whole, would benefit from becoming a member of the European Union? and Do you 
consider that you would personally benefit from Romania’s accession to the European 
Union?.  
 
Figure 1. The matrix of perceptions of the EU integration process 
Romania’s accesion to EU  
would bring... 
       Self advantages 
 
 
  Yes No Don’t know 
          Yes 54% 
active 
supporters 
16.5% 
moderate 
supporters 
13.7% 
pasive 
supporters 
Country advantages No 0.8% 
 
4.7% 
opponents 
0.6% 
 Don’t 
know
0.4% 
 
3% 6.3% 
absents 
 
 
Country  
advantages 
 
 
More than half of the population considers that both the country and themselves 
would benefit from EU accession. They trust the EU (DOPI score 70) and have a good 
representation of it (DOPI score 77). The three things that these active supporters 
think about when asked about the EU are: positive effects of the accession on the 
evolution of the Romanian economy (57%); positive effects of the accession on the 
external image of the country (25%); free movement for persons as a result of visa 
abolition (13%). At its turn, Romania has “a lot to offer to the EU” (DOPI score 41) and 
its membership would be perfectly justified in historical and geographical terms (DOPI 
score 73). The EU accession would  give a boost to the Romanian economy (DOPI score 
83) without increasing the unemployment (DOPI score –32), leading to improvements in 
the standard of life (DOPI score 82).  
 
The second largest group is those of moderate supporters, who consider that the 
integration process would put the country in a winner position, but it would rather have a 
neutral impact on their own welfare. Similar views are shared with the active supporters, 
except for the moderate scores recorded. The first three things they would think about 
regarding the EU remain the same, with 53% appreciating that the EU integration would 
have positive impact on the Romanian economy. 
 
By specific differences, the group of passive supporters is not well identified. Their 
opinions do not differ from those of the other supporters, except maybe on their intensity; 
what differentiate them is their inability to place themselves in a position on the winner-
loser axe.  
 
The opponents represent a small group, with a negative perception of the EU (DOPI 
score –16), low trust in the EU (DOPI scor 11), the effects of accession on the Romanian 
economy are contrasting (DOPI scor 2), with potentially rising unemployment (DOPI 
score 3). Despite these consideration, the majority within this group would vote “yes” at 
a would-be referendum. 
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The last group belongs to those who could identify neither themselves, nor the country on 
the winner-loser axe. Except for this group, that is neutral on all aspects, an interesting 
feature is the poor perception of the country leaders as regards their efforts toward the 
EU integration. The active supporters have a less favorable opinion on this (DOPI score 
only 20), the moderate activists have an almost neutral opinion (DOPI score 1), going 
down to the negative representation in the eyes of the opponents (DOPI score –22). 
 
The general level of satisfaction with the current life is low, with a negative overall score 
of –24. However, the EU active supporters are less unsatisfied with their current life 
(DOPI score –10), while the EU opponents are really unsatisfied with their current life 
(DOPI score –43). We might interpret these findings as the EU opponents are recruited 
among those that have already had a loser experience, although it is not clear whether or 
not their loser experience was due either to integration, or merely to the transition 
process.  
 
Table 1. Socio-ocupational groups defined as winners and losers  
Group supporters opponents absents sample 
Unemployed 38 -12 2 23 
Retired 19 -28 -2 8 
Peasants/farmers 35 -10 -1 21 
Employees 57 -18 0 34 
Industrial workers 46 -18 0 27 
Entrepreneurs 
(SMM enterprises) 
47 -6 4 31 
Professors 54 -7 4 36 
Public officers 50 1 10 34 
Entrepreneurs 
(big enterprises) 
63 17 10 52 
Politicians 64 36 34 62 
Experts, free lancers 68 3 16 51 
Note: the figures in this table are DOPI scores 
 
The differences in perceptions between supporters and opponents of the EU integration 
stem out clearly from table 1. However, regarding the people that are still actively 
involved in economy (so, except retired people), there is a certain degree of consensus 
as far as peasants (farmers) are concerned: they are less winners than others among  
supporters, rather losers among absent and definite losers  in the view of opponents. 
For the sample as a whole, they are at the bottom of the winners list. 
 
When aggregating individual perspectives, at the level of the entire society, the EU 
accession records highest scores of support. 
 
Figure 2. Is EU accesion useful for Romania? - DOPI scores, as compared to DOPI  
scores on OTAN accesion, confidence in government and the direction of Romania 
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Source: OSF Public Opinion Barometers (May 1999 – Nov.2000) 
Note: Dominant opinion index = (positive – negative)* (100 – missing)/100. Values: + 100 = the accession 
is useful, - 100 = the accession is not useful. Dominant opinion index was also computed for the 
confidence in Government. +100 = total confidence, -100= not at all confident. Confidence in Presidency, 
Parliament and political parties had almost the same levels and evolution.   
 
The permanent loss in confidence in national political institutions does not determine a 
loss in faith that European Union accession represents the necessary target  for our 
country. The Romanian case follows the relationship described in other cases8 - the level 
of popular support for the European integration is directly proportional with the degree of 
distrust and alienation towards the national political institutions (caused by  
mismanagement and corruption at public levels), and with the perceived capacity of 
supra-national institutions to compensate for the shortcomings at the national level. 
However, even within the EU, there is the principle of subsidiarity, meaning the 
delegation of authority at national level in a number of national relevant issues. A 
coherent public policy is needed therefore at national level in any case.   
 
3. The economic perspective 
3.1. Setting the stage for winners and losers: trade reorientation   
 
The collapse of the CMEA, the trade area of the socialist block, induced a fast, though 
not sharp, reorientation of the Romanian trade towards theEU, a trend characteristic to all 
CEE formerly planned economies. By the end of1999, more than 65.5% percent of 
Romania’s exports went to EU members, while the share of imports from the Common 
Market reached as high as 60%. The situation slightly changed in 2000, with exports to 
the EU represintg 63.7% of total exports, and imports from the EU reaching 56.2% of 
total imports. EU-15 accounts today for 59.6% of total Romanian trade flows. The 
                                                          
8 Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "The Political Basis of Support for European Integration," European Union 
Politics,  Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 2000), 147-171;  Christopher J. Anderson, "When in Doubt, Use Proxies: 
Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration," Comparative Political Studies, 
31 (1998), 569-601;  Mark N. Franklin şi C. Van der Eijk (ed.), Choosing  Europe? The European 
Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union", (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996). 
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figures are comparable to the share of intra-EU trade of many current EU members. One 
can say that at least from an economic perspective, and discounting for some trade 
barriers still existing in agriculture and a number of protected EU industries, Romania, 
together with most CEE economies, is de facto integrated in the EU trade connections.  
 
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of Romanian exports (%) 
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Figure 4. Geographical distribution of Romanian imports (%) 
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Romania had significant commercial links with the EU in the communist period, with a 
peak in the late ‘70s. As the former regime went on to repay foreign debt ahead of 
schedule, Romania applied an import substitution strategy in the ‘80s, with consequences 
on the modernization of its industry, and the trade with the EU. After Revolution, the EU 
became the largest trade partner of Romania as early as in 1991, at a share comparable 
with, and even higher than for other CEE economies. Trade with other regions, above all 
with the CIS states, has declined both relatively and in absolute terms, as the figures 
suggest. Yet Russia has remained the major supplier raw materials (mainly oil and gas) 
for Romania. 
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Several main factors have contributed to this evolution. First, the steady emergence, and 
then consolidation of the institutional framework governing trade relations between 
Romania and its EU and CEE partners. On the EU side this culminated with the signing 
of the pre-accession agreement, the Association Agreement, in February 1993. The 
accord put the basis of the gradual removal of quantitative trade barriers between 
Romania and the EU, with the exception of agriculture and several industries, “sensitive” 
for the EU partners. While some consider the treaty not asymmetrical enough towards the 
CEE countries, leading to worsening trade balances, or even that its presence actually 
hinders trade relations between the two sides, the significant increase in trade volumes 
between Romania and the EU in the years after the signing cannot only be coincidental. 
In addition, the recent evolution shows that for the last three consecutive years the 
export/import coverage ratio with EU has nevertheless improved. 
 
Table 2. Romanian foreign trade, total and with the EU countries 
 Export 
total 
Import  
total 
Coverage
ratio 
Export  
EU 
Import  
EU 
Coverage 
ratio 
 mil. USD mil. USD % mil. USD mil. USD %
1991 4,265,216 5,794,158 73.61 1,575,897 1,663,612 94.73
1992 4,363,360 6,014,640 72.55 1,534,735 2,466,713 62.22
1993 4,892,120 6,521,671 75.01 2,023,343 2,955,222 68.47
1994 6,151,334 7,109,003 86.53 2,964.244 3,427,654 86.48
1995 7,910,019 10,277,871 76.96 4,283,421 5,185,543 82.60
1996 8,084,458 11,435,273 70.70 4,568,590 5,986,143 76.32
1997 8,431,000 11,280,000 74.74 4,768,000 5,922,000 80.51
1998 8,302,000 11,838,000 70.13 5,358,000 6,829,900 78.45
1999 8,504,700 10,392,100 81.84 5,571,400 6,276,700 88.76
11 luni 
2000 
9,528,700 11,512,200 82.77 6,071,800 6,472,300 93.81
Source: computed after NSC 
 
A note of caution is needed however on these positive dynamics: aggregate numbers can 
be pretty deceptive as to the quality of Romanian exports and to the impact of trade on 
the economy. 
 
With respect to the CEE, the turning point in trade relations was marked by the adoption 
of the CEFTA treaty, which came into functioning in July 1997. It is probably too early 
to be enthusiastic about the gradual, but steady increase in trade levels with CEE partners 
after 1997 (reaching 7%, respectively 8.9% of Romania’s exports and imports in 1999), 
which were seriously hurt in the aftermath of the CMEA dissolution. Many analysts 
(Inotai, 2000) consider that there are further good premises for regional integration and 
trade growth, although within the boundaries defined by the EU accession process, the 
foremost objective of each country in the region. 
 
The second important factor explaining the figures above is the internal economic reform 
process underway in transitional economies. Although the speed or depth of restructuring 
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varied considerably from country to country, some crucial steps, which are prerequisites 
to successful adjustment to the new, competitive economic environment (such as price 
liberalization leading to temporary loss of price competitiveness, privatization or the 
adoption of new legislation governing market behavior –which partially explain some of 
the initial syncope in trade levels in early years of reform as well-), are common 
throughout the region. 
 
Furthermore the charts suggest that the reorientation of trade towards the EU partners 
was accompanied by significant trade creation. The latter occurred following, on one 
hand, the progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers required by the Association 
Agreement, and on the other hand, through dynamic positive internal effects such as 
economies of scale introduced by technology transfers and FDI inflows, diversification of 
products traded on international markets, or the increased competition entailed by the 
erosion of the power of some domestic monopolies.  For Romania, the volume of exports 
traded with the EU went up from under USD 2 bn. in 1990 to over USD 5.5 bn. at the end 
of 1999. Inevitably, geographical adjustment and the dissolution of the CMEA have also 
resulted in trade diversion, away from traditional trade partners during the communist 
period, such as the CIS countries.  
 
A fundamental question raised at this stage is: Is the geographical redistribution of the 
Romanian trade, now clearly oriented towards the EU, sustainable? As the institutional 
framework underlying the trade policies of the CEE countries is quite irreversible, and,  
somehow, rigidly, defined by the association agreements, as EU membership candidates, 
as well as by their aspirations, the answer here seems to be affirmative. Romania, like all 
other present and future EU members is already very much a participant in the Single 
Market, and therefore trade patterns follow its rules and rigours. The true question to be 
raised is therefore rather: When will Romania achieve full economic integration, both 
institutionally and as a participant in the redistribution mechanisms of the Union? 
Obviously, the answer here has a political dimension. 
 
Geographical dynamic adjustment is important because it captures the capacity of the 
Romanian economy to develop long-term commercial links, capable to buffer short terms 
global turbulence and adverse shocks without major shake-ups. In order to investigate the 
extent to which the Romanian foreign trade has adjusted geographically towards the EU,  
in the ten years of transition, we resort to standard measures of geographical adjustment 
indices9. Indices for imports from and exports to the EU are presented in the graph below. 
                                                          
9 We construct an index of geographical adjustment of imports (m) from, respectively exports (x) to the 
EU, defined as follows: 
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where i = 1…N is the country’s partner and t the period for which the index is calculated. It follows that 
the index expresses the cumulative changes in quantity imported (exported) over two consecutive periods 
relative to the total amount of imports (exports) corresponding to the previous period. The changes are 
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Figure 5. Romanian geographical adjustment indices towards EU 
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Foreign trade is adjusted when a country records a relatively stable geographical 
composition of transactions, after a certain number of periods during which quantitative 
fluctuations are declining in amplitude. The faster the drop in the level of the index, the 
quicker geographical stabilisation is achieved. An index of 0,1 – 0,15 indicates a 
relatively high geographical stability of foreign trade. Grosso modo this level of 
expression captures both the international conjuncture and the country’s internal capacity 
to carry out transactions. The evolution of the index shows that, since 1996, the 
Romanian foreign trade has reached a relative geographical stability vis-à-vis the EU, 
after a period of significant changes. 
 
In this context, onr can say, at a first approximation, that Romania has adjusted its 
foreign transactions according to the existing economic situation on world markets. 
Yet, although geographically stable, Romanian foreign trade is carried out on a less 
efficient basis , due to the productivity gap relative to the main trade partners. One of the 
reasons could be the fact that geographic adjustment has not been accompanied by 
sufficient change in the commodity structure of exported goods. 
 
2.2. Winning and losing sectors: 
revealed comparative advantages, unit labor costs, productivity 
 
?We acknowledge that relatively little attention is paid to agricultural products in our 
paper. However, sufficient facts are available to qualify us to include agriculture in the 
sensitive sectors, with a significant loss potential.  
 
What we can notice is that for groups I, II and IV (animals and live animals, vegetal 
products, food, tobacco, beverages) the trend of RCAA with the EU is above the trend of 
RCAA with the rest of the world. At the same time, only for group I, RCAAc in 1998, 
e.g., is -1.98, by comparison with a neutral RCAAeu (-0.01). If we extend the analysis to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
considered in absolute value, in order to capture the overall effect of switching from a traditional to a new 
market. See Zaman (1999) for details. 
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include group V (minerals) in the natural resource-intensive class10, then this class 
accounts for only 7.43% of Romania’s imports from EU, while representing 27.34% 
of Romania’s imports from CEFTA11.  
 
The asymmetrical concessions in the EU Association Agreement have probably protected 
most of our agricultural products from facing competition, while the symmetrical feature 
of the CEFTA accession has brought significant trade deficits in these products. The 
abolishment of barriers in agricultural trade with the EU, scheduled for 2002, should 
therefore be a matter of great concern regarding the ability of this sector to cope with 
European competition. It is our guess that we already face such competition through 
intermediaries, as part of CEFTA exports to Romania might be actually re-exports (by 
such mechanism, EU exporters can avoid tariffs).  
 
What might be even worse, and we must signal it as a working hypothesis at this time, 
is that in the very likely case of a number of CEFTA countries joining EU faster 
than Romania, our deficit with EU in agricultural products will worsen sharply, and 
RCAAeu will follow a similar trend. Consequently, what we have negotiated with EU 
in the agricultural sector needs to be re-negotiated - we believe that in advance - , or 
else, a chronic disequillibrium will be automatically enforced. 
 
?Let us focus now on the industrial goods. A clear loser in the process of EU 
integration is the chemical sector. As one can see from below, revealed comparative 
disadvantages with the EU are on a steep downward trend, while with the rest of the 
world we still seem to have a comparative advantage. Furthermore, the percentage of 
chemical imports in imports from EU has remained steady, while the percentage of 
chemical exports has decreased by more than two times over the last five years12. Since 
imports from EU represent two thirds of total chemical imports, the prolongation of this 
inneficient pattern of trade may lead to chronic disequilibrium in the chemical sector, and 
chronic inability to restructure.  
 
Table 3. Chemical industry: an EU loser 
 
 
                                                                Figure 6. Trade facts in the chemical sector 
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10 According to the so-called Krausse classifica on. For a detailed description of the Krausse classification, 
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these imports have steadily increased over the last years,signaling a deeper 
deterioration 
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of the performance of these industries. On the other hand, one should not jump to the 
conclusion that these sectors are losers due to the EU integration, because we also 
perform worse than CEFTA countries. Take plastics (39) and rubber (40), for example. 
The RCABeu for Romania in 1999 was 0.65 for item 39 and 0.76 for item 40 (below unit 
value shows disadvantage), while RCABeu for CEFTA countries13 (minus Romania) was 
1.31 for item 39 and 1.92 for item 40. It comes out that we perform poorer than 
comparable countries on the trade relationship with a third partner (EU). Take also group 
X (paper and related products) – in 1998, RCAAc for Romania recorded a disastrous –
3.14, showing (apart from being too early to join an organization with symmetrical 
concessions) that the domestic structures of production might be uncompetitive in 
 16
                                                          
13 When speaking about CEFTA-6 we could as well speak about CEFTA-5, as we have found no 
significant statistical differencies with or without considering Bulgaria. 
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general terms, not only as far as the EU is regarded. Therefore, we hesitate to include 
these sectors in the EU loser team. 
 
?The wooden products group (group IX) records a healthy growth in RCAAeu, from 
0.86 in 1995 to 1.89 in 2000, while RCAAr remained rather constant, also at high 
positive levels. There is no surprise regarding the competitive advantage in general, as 
Havlik (2000)14 identifies this group among traditional winners for CEFTA countries. 
What shows a winner position is the improved trend of RCAAeu.  
 
?Two of the most dominant Romanian industries (repesenting together 32.43% of 
total exports, respectively 47.04 of exports to the EU), namely textiles (group XI) and 
footwear (group XII) are likely to be in the winners’ boat, as they enjoy revealed 
comparative advantages with the EU, both when we calculate RCAAeu and RCABeu. 
This might be true for the time being, but we should warn on a significant slowdown, 
putting at risk the competitiveness of these sectors on medium-term. RCAAeu for 
group 11 went from 0.54 in 1996 to 0.26 in 2000, and from 1.72 in 1996 to 1.47 in 2000 
for group 12, while both groups have recorded negative values in 2000 on trade with the 
rest of the world. The explanations can be twofold: 
- tax avoidance by practicing transfer prices. It is reasonably to assume this, as the 
percentage of foreign companies in this export-driven industry is high, and a recent 
RCEP study (2000)15 shows that transfer prices are widely used by foreign companies 
(they calculate that 46% of the foreign companies that obtain more than 75% of their 
turnover from export activity make losses from exports); 
- the too high labor costs, in these labor-intensive industries. According to Havlik 
(2000)16, the unit labor cost17 in the Romanian textile industry was on average more 
than two and a half time higher than in the manufacturing industry. In a labor-
intensive industry, the persistence of such a situation might turn that industry into 
loss-making. This is due not to high wages, but to low labor productivity. 
Table 4. Labour productivity, selected CEEC countries, year 1998 
Manufacturing = 100 
 
  Czech 
Republic
Hungary Poland Romania Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia Bulgaria
D Manufacturing total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
DA Food products; beverages 
and tobacco 
139,8 97,2 129,4 179,0 129,8 173,2 141,4
DB Textiles and textile products 43,9 22,1 40,4 29,6 26,5 47,9 37,6
DC Leather and leather products 30,1 21,8 42,5 46,5 27,8 50,5 37,3
DD Wood and wood products 45,9 60,6 80,4 55,7 28,7 59,4 62,8
                                                          
14 Havlik,Peter Industrial competitiveness of CEECs WIIW working paper, 2000 
15 Munteanu,Costea; Boscaiu,Voicu; Liusnea,Daniela; Puscoi,Lucia The impact of foreign trade and 
foreign direct investments on productivity in the manufacturing industry. The case of Romania The 
Romanian Center for Economic Policies, research paper no.22/2000.  
16 idem 8. 
17 ULC = Wage / (gross output/employed persons) 
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DE Pulp, paper & paper 
products; publishing & 
printing 
138,2 119,1 147,2 69,5 123,6 89,2 104,8
DF Coke, refined petroleum 
products & nuclear fuel 
1076,8 233,5 458,0 596,2 734,3 304,2 604,7
DG Chemicals, chemical 
products and man-made 
fibres 
219,5 124,6 146,3 137,6 167,5 212,7 162,4
DH Rubber and plastic products 84,7 93,3 116,1 99,8 117,0 100,8 85,8
DI Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
83,4 66,1 81,9 83,0 82,6 105,1 86,7
DJ Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 
89,4 100,7 100,9 167,2 112,0 78,4 246,8
DK Machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 
66,1 55,6 66,8 39,2 52,7 81,3 59,5
DL Electrical and optical 
equipment 
96,5 162,6 112,3 111,7 64,3 77,5 61,8
DM Transport equipment 169,0 251,3 137,1 119,3 320,6 249,9 98,4
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 55,9 41,1 69,8 49,2 42,5 93,7 53,4
Source: WIIW Industrial Database. 
 
                                                                           Figure 9. Textile sector: unit labor cost 
 
The other problem identified, low productivity, also holds true: during the entire year 
1999 productivity in the textile industry was on a negative side (less than 100% of 
previous period, on trimestrial basis), and the same story can be said about its sister 
industry - footwear. Furthermore, the number of employees in the textile sector as a 
percentage in total industry employees (see figure 8) decreased over the years, with a 
minimum in 1997, then it reversed its trend, which might explain the low labor 
productivity. Since most of the textile industry is in private hands, a question arises: Why 
do private owners keep employing people, if labor productivity is low? The idea is that 
the number of employees is growing, but their wages are among the worst in industry. 
So, the textile and footwear industry, representing almost half of our exports to the EU, 
are characterized by decreasing revealed comparative advantages, low wages, low labor 
productivity, high unit labor costs, low value-added exports and, as a general 
consequence, decreasing revealed comparative advantages. This should be of great 
concern to entrepreneurs, as well as to policy makers. 
We also draw a dynamic 
picture of ULC in the textile 
sector, and reached similar 
results: the unit labor cost in 
textiles has exceeded the 
industry average for the last 
ten years, with a worsening 
trend since 1997. 
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   Figure 10. Productivity and other indicators in textiles and footwear sectors 
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?Another mixed story has to be told as far as groups XIII (glass and ceramics), XVII 
(means of transport) and XVIII (optical, medical, photo instruments) are concerned. 
They are not necessarily losers, as (except, maybe, group XIII) although they have 
hardly ever been winners. The RCAAeu is either declining, or steady at negative 
values. However, we are at  clear cut disadvantage with CEFTA countries: in group XIII, 
in 1998, our RCAAc was –1.36; at the same time, group XVII is a winner in Czech 
Republic, and group XVIII is a winner in Hungary. Therefore, we should make again 
the hypothesis on the negative effects of CEFTA countries joining EU in separate 
groups, with Romania left outside the first-runners group. What Richter and Mortensen 
(2000)18 say in general terms: “(…) all else being equal, the larger the Union, the greater 
its gains and, hence, the loss to non-member countries”, we can easily transfer for the 
case of a non-member Romania, in case the targeted sectors remain unprotected.  
 
?We also seem to have potential winners. They can be identified, subject of further re-
technologization, and also of removing EU barriers, in groups XV (metals) and 
surprisingly XVI (machines and equipment). For metals, we have positive RCAAeu, 
maintaining them in 2000 at the same level as in 1992 (+0.8); yet, our RCAAr, also 
decreasing, stays higher than RCAAeu. Potential does exist, it only remains to be realized  
by removing EU protectionist measures at some products of the metallurgical sector.  
 
The technology-intensive group XVI records a significant and constant reduction in 
our competitive disadvantage toward the EU, from –1.42 in the year of signing the 
Association Agreement to –0.66 in the first 7 months of 2000. Efficiency gains due to 
imports of technology can be noticed, with one trimester gap.   
 
Considering recent developments, both metallurgy and machines and equipment 
industries share apparent improved productivity and industrial production 
indicators. Metallurgy also shows an ULC well below the average, as opposed to above 
                                                          
18 Richter,Sandor and Mortensen,Jorgen Measurement of costs and benefits of accession to the EU for 
selected countries in CEE WIIW working papers, 2000. 
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the average ULC for machinery and equipment. This feature is however normal for the 
machinery and equipment sector, as it is technology-intensive, and it is not impeding on 
its performances. The cut in the percentage of employees (see figure 8) might prove that 
substantial restructuring took place, and that it paid off – as productivity and industrial 
production figures show. Furthermore, the recovery in the percentage of employees since 
1998 might signal that employment increases in this sector on a healthy, efficient basis. 
As we go for an in depth analysis further on in this paper, we will show that appearances 
of positive evolution of technology-intensive sectors are deceiving. When we turn our 
attention, in another chapter, to the patterns of job destruction, we will also argue that 
restructuring has not necessarily taken place in the right direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Productivity and other indicators for metallurgy, machinery and equipment 
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Figure 12. Unit labor costs for metallurgy, machinery and equipment 
?Finally, furniture (main component of group XX - others) seems to have been a 
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furniture exports in exports to EU has plunged from 18.1% in the year before signing the 
Association Agreement to only 6.81% in the first 7 months of 2000. The same motifs 
explained under textile section may apply here for the slowdown. As furniture is also 
traditional for CEFTA countries, the same two (or more) stages accession effect may lead 
to further losses.  
 
Figure 13. Unit labor cost for group XX – other industrial activities, mainly furniture 
As group XX (mainly composed of 
furniture) is considered unskilled 
labor intensive (Krausse 
classification), the unit labor cost 
matters in this sector, and its 
evolution provides an 
explanation for the otherwise 
surprising identification of the 
furniture industry as a loser. 
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We say furniture seems to be in a loser position. But does it have to be so? If one looks at 
the winner position revealed for wooden products, it means that potential does exist. 
What happens is that we export low value added wooden products, closer to raw 
materials than to manufactured items, and we heavily import furniture. A reason for this 
is the high demand for wooden products abroad, particularly in neighboring countries, 
that makes exporting logs, for example, a simple and profitable business. Another reason 
is the indirect impact of foreign direct investments, as foreign companies seem to prefer 
to import furniture for offices and warehouses. Local companies importing furniture and 
acting as intermediaries are therefore in winning position, although the sector as a whole 
is at a loss. 
 
2.3. Beyond statistics: our winners play in the second league 
 
The results of our study on revealed comparative advantages19 in technology-intensive 
sectors, mainly group XVI machines and equipments, look very promising at a first 
glance. Even when compared with production, productivity and unit labor cost analysis - 
analysis drawn, due to statistical inconsistency, based on CANE20 structure, instead of 
combined nomenclature - the optimist conclusions get support. However, the devil stays 
                                                          
19 Iancu, Aurel in Theories of advantage, industrial development and economic integration Oeconomica 
no.3-4/2000, insist on the distinction between comparative and competitive advantages. We start our 
analysis, on industrial sectors, with revealed comparative advantages (a method used in recent studies on 
CEECs countries, such as those under the aegis of Bank of Finland, or WIIW). However, we share a 
broader perspective, by mixing trade facts with biased factor endowment analysis, as well as with labor 
migration, research and development, and education. All of these bring us closer to the interpretation of 
competitive advantages, which is also demonstrated by our non-neutral policy recommendations.  
20 CANE refers to Classification on Activities of National Economies. 
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in the details, and small details can make a big difference. Since the picture for group 
XVI was quite intriguing, we considered a more in-depth examination necessary. 
 
From the very beginning, we must say that the statistical data available (after 
considerable efforts) pose serious doubts due to their lack of consistency. The detailed 
data for years 1997 and 1998 are in USD, refer to our total trade and are provided by 
Romanian sources; the data for 1999 and the first 10 months of 2000 are in Euro, refer to 
trade with the EU and are provided by European sources. The differences between them 
are disturbing, yet not surprising; even more disturbing are the differences between 
Romanian data once calculated based on CANE structure, and then on the combined 
nomenclature. E.g., product 84733010 (electronic assemblies for automatic data-
processing machines or for other machines) records exports to EU21 worthing 0.6 mil. 
Euro in 1997, 4.8 mil. Euro in 1998, 53.7 (!) mil. Euro in 1999 and 0 (zero) in 200022.. 
We must consider the data in our hand quite unreliable for a trend analysis and limit 
ourselves to interpreting the composition of group XVI.  
 
Group XVI consists of two classes: 84 - nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; and 85 - machinery and mechanical appliances and electrical 
equipment, sound and television image recorders and reproducers.  
 
As far as the class 84 is concerned, the most significant share of our exports (varying in a 
narrow band around 18% over the last four years23) is held by roller and ball bearings 
(mainly product 848210, as well as products 848220 and 848280). What else do we 
export? Parts for air or vacuum pumps or compressors (product 841490) had 14.6% of 
our exports in class 84 in 1999; other major export products in this class are parts for 
machines and equipments (84314980), parts and accessories for machine tools for metal 
processing without removing material (84669490), parts and accessories for machine 
tools for metal processing by removing material (84669395), valves and similar articles 
for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats or the like (84818099). Different types of machines 
and equipments have a rather symbolical presence in our export structure (below 2% for 
each type). Therefore, we actually produce and export parts for machines and 
equipments, rather than the very machines and equipments. This is not necessarily 
bad on condition that exports are steady and export values increase to reflect higher 
sophistication. 
 
The structure of exports in class 85 brings further evidence to support the above remark. 
Ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets for vehicles, aircrafts or ships (854430 - 
although declining in 2000) hold more than one third of our so-called “technology-
intensive” exports in this group.  With one significant exception (electric engines, under 
8501), the other main exports in this class are also parts and components, as follows: 
                                                          
21 Computed from country-by-country data from NSC and translated into Euro at a reasonable average rate 
of  1USD = 1.05 Euro  
22 Such examples are even more disconcerting in light of the fact that Romania has started negotiations 
with the EU on chapter on statistics.  
23 For year 2000, exports are adjusted on a 12-month basis. 
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parts of electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy (85179088), heating 
resistors (85168099), conductors (85444190 and 85445190). 
 
The import picture is also not very bright. Under class 84, we import office equipment 
(under 8473 - which is not productive input), sewing machines and wood processing 
machines (under 8452), rubber and plastic processing machines (under 8477), and other 
similar machines and equipments to be used as inputs in traditional, yet low-technology 
intensive industries. 
 
Regarding class 85, our main imports consist in dead-end products such as mobile 
phones, TV and radio sets, recorders, etc (under 8517, 8525, 8529), not to mention that 
ignition wiring sets are also heavily imported (about 10% of imports in class 85 - in 
absolute terms we record deficits under this product type). 
 
There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from interpreting the structure of 
foreign trade in group XVI: 
• the exports of  “technology-intensive” group XVI actually consist of labor-
intensive products24 such as spare parts and machines’ components. Despite their 
somehow inappropriate classification, most of Romania’s technology-intensive 
exports are products for which the labor cost matters. We said earlier that Romania 
records increasing performances in machines and equipments’ group; and this is true, 
in terms of diminishing revealed comparative disadvantages. Yet, the reason why we 
have improved our competitive position here is simply because we are exporting 
labor-intensive products, where we can apply the same line of reasoning from similar 
groups like textiles or wooden products.  
• the imports of “technology-intensive” group XVI belong to two categories. On the 
one hand, there are final goods, with no relevance and/or impact on the level of local 
production and export. On the other hand, there are machines and equipments used as 
inputs in low technology-intensive sectors, such as textile, wood, metal, plastic 
processing. This second category of “technology-intensive” imports has one major 
effect: it perpetuates the traditional division of foreign trade, with labor-intensive 
and human capital-intensive products. This is to say, the imports of what should be 
high value-added inputs serve to the export of low value-added outputs - we can 
                                                          
24 Krausse classification defines as “unskilled labor intensive” those commodities with the lowest value 
added per employee, including textiles, garments, furniture, glass, while goods with the lowest ratios of 
R&D expenditure to value added are named “human capital intensive”, containing paints, rubber, paper, 
TV and radio sets (other groups are “natural resource intensive” and “technology intensive”). Lary 
classification is even more disconcerting: “skilled labor intensive” means explosives, fur skins, optical, 
medical, measuring instruments, home electrical appliances, aircraft, ships, partially metal manufacturing; 
“unskilled labor intensive” has textiles, leather and wooden products, energy distribution equipment, 
furniture, footwear, watches; “psychical and human capital intensive” contains perfumery, fertilizers, floor 
coverings, tapestries, mineral manufactures, sanitary, heating, lighting fixtures and fittings (another group 
is “physical capital intensive”). OECD considers that within the “labor intensive” group, that features 
garments, footwear, toys, etc, the major competitive factor is the cost of unskilled and semi-skilled labor 
(other groups are “resource intensive”, “scale intensive”, “differentiated”, “science-based” – the latter 
mirrors the rapid application of science to technology”).  
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call it the paradox of the Romanian foreign trade. We do not import for technical 
renewal, but for maintaining the current structure.  
 
• The above remarks suggest that there is a subcontracting culture already 
implemented in Romania, based on our low wage costs, and that this 
subcontracting has spread around to include so-called “technology-intensive” 
products, or should we rather say “low-technology intensive products produced in 
Romania as part of high-technology products finally assembled somewhere else”. 
 
Now, that we’ve established these facts, two simple questions come to our mind. First, 
how have these facts been influenced by the process of European integration? Second, 
are these facts basically useful or harmful to the Romanian economy? 
 
First, the subcontracting culture does not limit itself to Western Europe. Neither do 
our spare parts exports, nor our imports of machines for low-value added industries. The 
fact that they prevail in the relationship with the European Union comes from the natural 
fact that European Union prevails in our foreign trade. The EU prevalence would have 
probabily existed even in the absence of the Association Agreements, given the 
geographical proximity; it is only the volume of the trade, not the direction of it, that 
would have probably been affected due to higher levels of protection. It is therefore hard 
to say that what happens to group XVI is a result of European integration; and it is also 
difficult to say that it is not. The problem that can be identified here in connection 
with the integration process lies in the legal and competition issues associated with 
subcontracting. The Romanian law (including Competition Law and Regulations of the 
Competition Council) does not even specify the word subcontracting, while the European 
Commission issued a notice on subcontracting agreements as early as in 1978. However, 
this lack of adequate legislation is not peculiar to Romania only, as none CEE country 
has adopted a specific legislation on subcontracting. Nonetheless, Romanian authorities 
need to become aware that subcontracting is a common practice, and subsequently need 
to pass legislation to protect the rights of the local companies acting as subcontractors, to 
encourage and enable them to develop the products and technologies that have been 
licensed to them into new products and technologies  of their own. 
The competition issue described above relates to our second question. It depends on how 
you look at it. Subcontracting, based on low wage costs, can be good because it 
provides jobs for millions of Romanians; and it can be bad because these jobs are in 
low value-added sectors, perpetuating low wages, and low standards of life. Apart 
from how you look at this issue, the answer also depends on judging it in a broader 
context.  
 
The reality is that we have a large and substantially underutilizied workforce and, in the 
context of future EU deficit of workforce25, Romania has the chance to become a pool 
of human resources for European plants (either directly, at the source, or indirectly, at 
                                                          
25 Such a deficit is predictable due to at least two factors: first, the aging process of the population, and 
second, the low propensity of Western workers to fulfill “dirty” jobs, mainly in energy-intensive, polluting 
industries.  
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their subcontracting units). Even now, when there are paramount legal barriers to 
emigration to EU (visa requirements and work permits legislation), Romania is, 
together with Poland, the only CEE country with a record of large net emigration26. 
Moreover, 47.2% of foreign workers legally employed in Hungary come from 
Romania27, not to mention the illegal emigration. As wage differentials constitute the 
main incentive for working abroad, the potential for further emigration is enhanced 
by a big mass of people that are either unemployed (1 million registered, more others out 
of records), or employed in the underground economy (mild estimations say 650.00028 – 
next section of our paper will deal with labor market issues in more depth). Furthermore, 
records so far show that Romanian labor outflows are dominated by people that were 
employed at the time of leaving the country. On the other hand, as any other resource, the 
Romanian workforce has its limits, of a demographic nature. Different sources29, 
taking into account only the net negative natural growth, come to the same conclusion: 
within the next four decades, the total population of Romania might shrink by 6 million 
people, if the current trend persists. Not  much labor to export, then, and also not much 
room for labor-intensive products, by that time.  
 
Of course, there is always a question mark on how to define labor-intensive sectors. 
Despite such terminological problems, it is clear that Romania currently competes  
mainly in labor-intensive products. The large and rather cheap workforce makes the 
difference in these products, attracts FDI and drives the export growth.  
 
Is there something wrong with being intensive in labor? In the short run, the answer is 
no, as long as alternatives are beyond immediate reach. In the long run, the answer is  
most likely yes, because there will always be another country intensive in even cheaper 
labor. In the case of Romania, the income gap with the EU will eventually – over a 
certain period of time - decrease, wage differentials will eventually diminish and labor 
costs will eventually rise. In the long run, both the players and the rules of the game will 
change. Therefore, we might lose our edge in our main competitive advantage: the labor 
cost. At the time this happens, the workforce will face reallocation. Reallocation to what? 
Alternatives must emerge in advance, as they should orient work reallocation. 
Competitive advantages must be created and developed in sectors that escape the labor 
cost trap. 
 
Is it possible to create alternatives? There is the experience of a number of Asian 
countries, that based their development on labor intensive products, and gradually 
changed the fuel of their growth towards more complex, science based, products and 
technologies. Between 1980 and 1992, labor intensive exports’ share in total exports 
                                                          
26 According to Langewiesche,Renate and Lubyova,Martina Migration, mobility and the free movement of 
persons: an issue for current and future EU members WIIW working  paper, 2000. The study does not 
cover former Yugoslav and Soviet republics, that probably share similar records.  
27 See above 
28 According to  Underground economy in Romania (coord.: Albu,Lucian and Tarhoaca,Cornel) RCEP 
preliminary report, 2000. 
29 See WHO Report 2000 and The state of the Romanian society, after 10 years of transition (editors: 
Zamfir,Catalin; Badescu,Ilie; Zamfir, Elena)  
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decreased for the Republic of Korea from 49.0% to 35.1%; the same downward trend 
was valid for Taiwan Province of China – from 55.5% to 38.4% -, Singapore – from 
19.3% to 11.5% -, Thailand – from 41.0% to 38.0% -, and even India – from 55.4% to 
49.6% - or China – from 66.6% to 58.4%. At the same time, the share of science based 
exports increased for the Republic of Korea from 2.1% to 5.4%, for Taiwan Province of 
China from 1.2% to 13.5%, for Singapore from 1.8% to 30.5%, for Thailand from 0% to 
10%, and for Malaysia from 3.8% to 9%. Furthermore, in the trade relationship with the 
EU countries, the Newly Industrialized Economies of South-East Asia have dramatically 
changed patterns, to reflect changes in factor endowment. Labor intensive exports of 
NIEs to EU, as a share in total NIEs’ exports to EU, more than halved from 59.6% in 
1980 to 24.6% in 1994, while the share of science based exports skyrocketed from 7.6% 
in 1980 to 28.3% in 199430. The credit for changing the patterns of Asian trade rests 
primarily with public authorities, who proved visionary enough  to pursue an industrial 
policy aimed at taking Asian economies out of a development trap31. 
 
The transformation that occurred in Asia was from economies of scale to economies of 
scope. Romanian manufacturing industry, by its very intensity in labor, belongs to a 
rather outdated development paradigm. Some labor intensive sectors arise as winners, 
and they might even be able to maintain their position, as long as they keep labor costs 
down. It is not the major league, but if this is the league we want to play in, then the 
future would seem rather secure, except for the demographic threats that we mentioned 
before. A future of low value added and of chronic trade deficit, financed by remittances 
from the exponents of net emigration. The winners -can we really call them winners?-, 
in this context, are rather given, and the losers have lost the battle before it had 
started. In order to change this state of things, and to be able to play in the major 
league, there is no escape from investing in research and development, education 
and skill formation (some economists would call this the new techno-economic 
paradigm32). 
 
At governmental level, research and development is hardly supported, as the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to GDP is four-five times lower than the ratio recorded in EU, and 
even in other CEE countries. At business level, the picture is more diffused. A recent 
study33 shows that 93% of Romanian car component manufacturers undertake research 
and development, while the CEE average lags behind, at 62%. The explanation stays in 
the activity of three different car manufacturers in Romania, that often delegate 
responsibilities not only in producing components, but also in designing or upgrading 
                                                          
30 Data from Sharing Asia’s dynamism: Asian direct investment in the European Union UNCTAD 
publication, 1996. 
31 See Rodrik, Dani Understanding economic policy reform, Journal of Economic Literature XXXIV, 1996 
and Liu, Tsou and Hammit Export activity and productivity: evidence from the Taiwan electronics 
industry, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, no.4/1999. 
32 See Diwan and Chakraborty High technology and international competitiveness Praeger NY, 1991, as 
reflected and interpreted in Donek, Ekrem Is the Turkish economy competitive in the new technology 
goods? Yapi Kredi Economic Review vol.9, no.2/1998. 
33 Lorentzen, Jochen and Mollgaard, Peter Vertical restraints and technology transfer: inter-firm 
agreements in Eastern Europe’s car component industry Department of International Economics and 
Management, Copenhagen Business School working paper no.9/2000.  
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them. However, if the scale of R&D is considered (in terms of R&D expenditure to total 
expenditures, or R&D sales to turnover), then the results will probably be a lot less 
spectacular. Regarding education, CEE countries, including Romania, lag significantly 
behind EU average with respect to the ratio of students to total population, and the ratio 
of technical oriented students to total students, not to mention that a part of those very 
well trained, especially in computers, can easily find a job abroad. Nonetheless, when 
R&D and education meet, we can produce remarkable results. Software producers and 
exporters, belong to the winner category – e.g. the Romanian company Softwin has 
created a software product, the first in the world to use WAP technology for remote 
access and control to security networks; this product was downloaded by almost half a 
million American users only in the last 45 days of the year 2000, helping Softwin to 
reach its target of 1% of the global anti-virus market in 2001, with the aim of 6% of the 
same market by 200634. Such a case35 is not singular, yet the spreading-out effect is quite 
low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The social perspective 
4.1. Winning and losing working groups 
 
As markets integrate, companies have to adapt to increasing competition in the product 
market. As a result, they are under severe pressure to shed excess labor in order to 
improve their productivity levels. The work force is pushed into changing their jobs, 
companies, sectors and sometimes even their occupations. This effect of integration is the 
focus of the present chapter of the analysis. Depending on the labor forces’ mobility and 
the speed of adjustment the integration cost for the labor force can be high or low. A 
quick reallocation requires sometimes relocation of the labor force, as people will have to 
move to where the jobs are. Ex post, the process might be beneficial for the economy, but 
at any moment in time there will be people winning or losing. A common sense 
perspective would advise that the losers are people close to retirement age, from the 
declining sectors, that have very specific skills not easily transferable, while the winners 
are younger people with the right skills, working in the growing sectors.  
 
While we acknowledge the necessity and the importance of labor reallocation, we 
recognize that there is scope for the policy maker to diminish the pressure on the labor 
force through adequate policies. Our analysis consists of comparing the structure of the 
employment by sector in Romania to the one in the EU. The study uses 1 digit level of 
aggregation data for reasons that will be presented later.  
 
                                                          
34 Data from the Romanian section of the web page www.europemedia.net 
35 That usually escapes official recording as export. 
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The analysis of winners/losers from the allocation of labor point of view complements 
the analysis based on foreign trade trends. While previously the winners/losers were 
identified by looking at export trends and at the comparative advantage of different 
sectors, and therefore presented a view of the current situation, the next analysis presents 
an image of who the winners/losers might be as the integration process goes even deeper. 
 
First, labor reallocation is necessary, because Eastern European companies have to operate, 
and survive, in a totally new environment. The dissolution of the traditional trade patterns  
and gradual integration of the region into the EU economic structures36 resulting in increased 
external competition oblige enterprises to restructure, and inevitably shed workers, freeing 
resources for the growing sectors. At the same time, sectors that have received little attention 
in communist times, mostly services-oriented, are growing, and their demand for labor picks 
up. De-industrialization and convergence towards EU structures of productions37, 
experienced not only by CEE countries, but also by the late entrants into the Union such as 
Greece, Portugal and Spain –as we will show- are in our opinion two important aspects of 
the reform process in Eastern Europe.  
 
Nevertheless, we shall mention that the convergence hypothesis is subject, in practice, to 
some limitations, such as: the process takes place over an undetermined period of time 
(integration is not the deadline for convergence, and even if it was, we would have no firm 
date set for integration); some discrepancies might persist, as they reflect, in some cases, 
either the basis of our current competitive advantages, or an unexploited potential of 
production capacity. 
 
The reason for focusing on broad (1-digit38) industrial sectors rather than more narrowly 
defined (2-digit) industries is twofold. In industrialized market economies there is 
considerable labor mobility between narrowly defined industries, but much larger problems 
associated with de-industrialization and the absorption of manufacturing workers in other 
sectors, that this where problems of structural adjustment can be expected to be most 
severe39. Similarly, prior to the reforms, inter-enterprise labor mobility was quite high in 
Eastern Europe and of the same order of magnitude as in many Western European countries 
(Jackman and Rutkowski, 1994). Yet, in the past the bulk of this mobility took the form of 
people moving between basically similar jobs in similar types of enterprise, and even if job 
mobility of this form were to remain high, as appears to be the case in Russia and elsewhere 
in the former FSU (see e.g. Commander et al., 1994) it would make no contribution to 
bringing about the enormous changes in the structure of employment by industry that are 
required.  
 
Second, with regard to the broader industrial groups, a comparison with market economies 
indicates a very clear picture of the main types of sectoral imbalance. By contrast, with the 
                                                          
36 A process whose speed and degree of integration is defined by the Europe Agreements Romania and 
other CEE countries have signed in the early ‘90s. 
37 However, there are significant disparities even within EU regarding the structures of productions. We 
deal with this issue by computing data for both Southern and Northern EU members.  
38 The standard OECD classification. 
39 See Britain or Spain during the ‘80s. 
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narrower categories, it is far from clear which countries should specialize in which sectors. It 
turns out in any event that employment changes in the different industry groups within any 
broad sector tend to be in the same direction, so not much is gained by finer detaliation. 
 
In this section we attempt to measure the change in the structure of employment required and 
the amount achieved so far in Romania relative to other CEE countries. We introduce 
measures both of the speed and of the efficiency of restructuring, and the effectiveness of 
new job creation in the growing sectors. The idea behind this type of analysis is that any 
fluctuations and changes in the structure of an economy, and preponderantly structural 
adjustments, have a reflection in changes in the labor market. Output swings, aggregate or 
sectoral,  might be determined in the short run by price distortions, exchange rate variations, 
direct or indirect government interventions such as subsidies to state enterprises (“soft 
budget constraints”), all present in a transitional economy. It is therefore difficult to isolate 
temporary output volatility from structural, irreversible modifications in production 
structures as a result of integration. This could be more visible by looking at fluctuations in 
the labor market. However, the mirror reflection of changes in the production structures into 
the labor market risk to be distorted when the economic environment does not record a 
consistent evolution (e.g., the steady growth ecorded in Hungary and Poland), but, quite the 
opposite, a boom-and-bust cycle. 
 
To answer these questions asked above, it is necessary to define a “warranted” structure of 
employment for each country, that is to say the structure that could be expected to develop in 
the long term given the current or future economic policies pursued by CEE countries, which 
are to a reasonable approximation those of the free market. One might attempt to determine 
this warranted structure in terms of the estimated long-run comparative advantage of the 
individual CEE countries in particular sectors (Hare and Hughes, 1992), but such estimates 
may build in features of the economy, such as the inherited physical capital stock, which will 
themselves change during the process of transition. Additionally, they are more feasible for 
traded goods sectors than for (private or public) services, though the service sector is critical 
for employment. 
 
Instead, we start from the idea that, to a first approximation, the structure of employment in 
the CEE countries should in the long run become more or less the same as in neighboring 
market economies. The differences in the inherited employment structure of the CEE 
economies as compared to a neighboring market economy can be attributed to the distortions 
of the planned economy, reflecting the material bias of production, obsolete technology, 
inappropriate relative factor prices and extensive use of labor resources. As these features are 
removed, the employment structure of CEE countries should come to resemble that of 
Western European countries.  
 
We would like to stress at this stage that we do not believe that CEE countries will or 
must have identical economic structures as EU economies, as there are differences 
between market economies themselves, but that gradually, over a sufficiently long 
period of time, these countries will converge towards such structures. How fast, or slow, 
this occurs will certainly depend on a variety of factors, not least on the speed of the reforms 
in transitional countries or the willingness of the EU to integrate them. 
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In Table 5, using OECD data which permits direct comparison by broad industrial sector, we 
contrast the employment structure of the CEE countries with that of Western European 
witness economies. The table indicates the scale of the problem. In comparison with the 
market economies, there is obviously excessive employment in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing industry in all countries. Services are everywhere underdeveloped, most 
obviously with finance (which covers business and professional services in addition to 
banking, insurance etc.), but also trade and community services (which include health and 
education as well as public administration). Construction and transport are much in line with 
market economy provision. As for Romania, the table shows that the country has the largest 
share of agricultural employment (27.9%), one of the largest manufacturing sectors (33%), 
and the smallest community services (15.3%) and trade (5.9%) sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Structure of employment (%) in 1989 
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South 
OECD 
North 
OECD 
Agriculture 19.0 11.7 16.6 26.8 27.9 13.8 10.7 4.1 
Mining 2.6 3.6 2.0 3.4 2.3 1.0 0.4 1.0 
Manufacturing 34.9 34.0 28.6 24.5 33.0 32.1 22.0 26.3 
Electricity, gas, 
water 
0.8 1.4 2.6 1.1 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.1 
Construction 7.8 7.3 7.0 7.8 7.0 11.6 8.1 6.4 
Trade 9.2 11.5 11.3 8.9 5.9 11.1 19.3 17.4 
Transportation 6.8 6.5 7.7 7.2 6.9 6.4 6.0 6.0 
Finance 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 6.1 8.6 
Community 
services 
18.4 23.5 23.4 19.3 15.3 22.0 26.5 28.7 
RI-South 24.2 17.2 16.5 23.0 31.3 18.4 - 10.0 
RI-North 27.3 19.6 19.6 27.7 33.4 21.6 10.0 - 
Source: OECD-Labour Force Statistics (1998) for OECD countries, and authors’ computations 
for Eastern European economies. 
Note: South OECD countries are: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. North OECD countries are: Denmark, 
Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. RI is the coefficient of restructuring, defined as the overall 
excess employment in the sectors where employment in the Eastern European country exceeds mean 
employment in the witness  countries (South, respectively North, OECD). 
 
Therefore, the process of integration into the EU structures is likely to result into some clear 
winners and losers. Agriculture, with its base of production consisting of very small, labor 
intensive farms, will have to suffer dramatic decreases in its work force, therefore a large 
part of the cost of integration will be paid by agricultural workers. This cost can be identified 
in terms of psychological distress, unemployment, and transfer costs. 
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Miners, on the other hand, are clearly losers, at least in short run, especially since the 
wellbeing of the entire community is dependent on the profitability of the mine. Their skills 
are not very high, so they could be easily used in other types of jobs, in construction, for 
example. But, they are quite immobile due to the depreciation of their apartments, which 
cover only a fraction of the price of a similar one elsewhere. So, unless the new employer 
covers the moving costs, the jobs have to come to them. 
 
Manufacturing is too broad, and the likeliness of losing jobs in the manufacturing, as a 
whole, does not qualify for narrower identification of winners and losers. 
 
For purposes of comparability we divided Western European countries into a Northern  tier 
(Denmark, (West) Germany, Netherlands, UK) and a Southern tier (Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain), to allow for the considerable differences in employment in agriculture (the 
average for the North is 4.1%, while for the South is 10.7%). These differences may be 
attributable in part to permanent features of the economic landscape such as climate and 
population densities, and in part to historical and institutional considerations. It is 
conspicuous, however, that in comparison with Northern Europe the imbalance in 
employment structure is concentrated almost exclusively in one sector - agriculture - where 
the CEE average of around 24% contrasts with only 4% in the Northern European countries. 
It would seem appropriate to allow for persistent differences along these lines in CEE 
countries also, and in the next section we use the Northern countries as the witness group for 
the Czech and Slovak republics and for Hungary and the Southern countries as a witness 
group for the others (Poland, Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
It is evident from Table 5 that the extent (as against the nature) of structural imbalance 
differs considerably between countries. To capture this asymmetry, in the final row of the 
table, we calculate an "index of restructuring" which measures the proportion of the 
workforce in each country which would need to change sector to enable the country to attain 
the same structure of employment as that of a comparable Western European economy in 
1989. To an approximation, hence, the index of restructuring measures the inherited 
“distortion” of formerly centrally planned economies at the (conventional) beginning of the 
reform, in the sense of departures from the average Western European economy; the larger 
the index, the higher the “distortion”, and most likely the adjustment and restructuring costs. 
 
As compared with the structure of employment in the Southern European countries, the 
extent of restructuring required in Romania, at 31.3% of the workforce, was at the 
outset, nearly double that required in Hungary (16.5%). In other words, in order to attain a 
Southern European employment structure in Romania, on average 31.3 workers out of 100 
had, in 1989, to change their broad sector, and presumably occupation, skills and even work 
area, in order for Romania to converge towards a South OECD employment distribution. 
Only 16.5 employees would have to do the same in Hungary. The discrepancy is even larger 
if we compare Romania with North OECD countries (33.4%), with most of the difference 
coming unsurprisingly from the large employment share in agriculture, and to some extent, 
manufacturing. While Romania is something of an outliner, the extent of restructuring 
required was also significantly greater in Bulgaria and (due to its abnormally large 
agricultural sector) in Poland than in the Czech or Slovak Republics, which are quite similar 
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to Hungary. In this context, we believe we do not mistake greatly if we state that, among the 
EU accession candidates investigated in the paper, Romania has apparently inherited the 
most distorted employment structure vis-à-vis an average EU economy, or even potential EU 
economy. 
 
Therefore, Romania compared to the other CEEs countries is the furthest away from 
achieving a structure of employment similar to the UE. So, in order to catch up, it should 
have a high speed of adjustment. This suggests the fact that out of all CEEs countries 
Romania’s population will be the most affected by the integration, needing a lot of 
flexibility to adapt to the new labor market conditions. However, there is scope for 
alleviating at least partially the cost by adopting adequate policies aimed at reducing labor 
market inflexibility40 and the cost of new jobs, and at creating the alternatives for labor 
reallocation in light of the revealed loss or win potential of some sectors of activity, as 
revealed by our previous trade analysis. 
 
Turning now to the second question, the amount of restructuring achieved, an obvious 
measure is simply to replicate Table 5 for the most recent year where comparative statistics 
are available, namely 1997, and compare the structural imbalances "now" with those that 
existed at the outset. The data for such a comparison are shown in Table 5. Here we include 
information for the reunified Germany. The remarkable feature of Table 6 is that the 
imbalances appear as great now as they were in 1989. While the proportion employed in 
manufacturing has fallen everywhere, including a remarkable 10% decline in Romania, and 
the proportions employed in trade and finance have risen, the proportion employed in 
agriculture has risen in some of the countries (notably Romania), and, most remarkably, the 
restructuring index shows very little improvement and has actually slipped back in some 
countries (compare the last two rows of the table). For Romania, in particular, the gap 
with Western Europe appeared to have widened, at 33.1% relative to the South, and as 
much as 40% relative to the North. 
 
Table 6.  Structure of employment (%) in 1997 
Sector Bulgaria Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South 
OECD 
North 
OECD 
Agriculture 24.3 5.7 7.9 20.5 37.5 8.6 9.3 3.0 
Mining 2.0 1.8 0.7 2.5 2.0 1.7 0.5 0.3 
Manufacturing 23.2 27.8 23.7 21.0 23.0 26.1 20.8 19.2 
Electricity, gas, 
water 
1.1 1.9 2.7 1.8 2.1 2.5 0.9 0.7 
Construction 4.9 9.7 6.0 6.6 4.9 8.9 8.3 7.2 
Trade 12.4 16.7 16.9 14.5 10.3 14.4 21.2 18.6 
Transportation 7.7 7.7 8.5 6.2 5.6 7.4 5.6 6.2 
Finance 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.1 0.8 1.4 7.7 11.2 
Community 
services 
21.8 26.7 31.3 24.8 13.7 29.0 25.7 30. 
RI-South 21.2 13.8 13.4 14.9 33.1 13.8 - - 
                                                          
40 Net migration might also contribute to increasing labor flexibility, although it still remains to be tested 
whether or not losers are movers up to a large extent. 
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RI-North 28.9 18.0 15.4 22.6 40.0 18.6 12.0 - 
RI-North-89 27.3 19.6 19.6 27.7 33.4 21.6 - 9.3 
Source: OECD-Labour Force Statistics (1998) for OECD countries, and authors’ computations for 
Eastern European economies. 
 
The situation after seven years of transition is not very bright. Instead of decreasing, the 
employment in agriculture has risen. The speed of job destruction that took place in 
manufacturing mainly has not been matched by the speed of job creation, leaving a 
large part of the people with no means of support except the agricultural work. These 
workers are losers of integration.  
 
The apparent lack of progress in restructuring despite substantial job losses reflects several 
phenomena. First, there is a problem of "moving goalposts" - the market economies are 
themselves in the process of relatively rapid structural change (9.3% between 1989 and 
1997, as the last row of the table shows), and the transition economies need quite a rapid 
pace of employment reallocation simply to avoid falling further behind (in all cases 
employment changes in market economies are moving them further away from the 
employment structure of the transition economies). If one calculates the gap in employment 
structure between the transition economies in 1997 and the witness economies in 1989, all 
the transition economies show some improvement, most notably the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. This remark must be qualified by the fact that these two countries are not known 
as most advanced in the restructuring process. Statistics and reality do not frequently match 
(remember the first impression we had on the growth of technology-intensive exports).  
 
In Romania the widening of the distance relative to Western Europe appears to be 
attributable mostly to the rise of the share of agriculture in total employment from 27.9% in 
1989 to more than 37% in 1997, but also due to the decline of the pro-cyclical construction 
sector, probably due to recession. Another explanation for losing jobs in construction stays 
with the net Romanian emigration intensive in a few number of sectors, mainly 
construction41. Employment in community services shrunk to 13.8% in 1997, by far the 
lowest in Eastern Europe, again probably due to budgetary cuts (education, health and public 
administration are all on the expenditure side of the budget, under severe strain after 1996 in 
Romania). On the positive side, employment in trade, a sector with huge potential in 
Romania, continued to grow both in relative and absolute terms, reaching about 10% of total 
employment, although further job creation and growth in trade is still possible and desirable 
(the average share of trade in total employment is 21.2% in Southern Europe, respectively 
18.6% in the North). 
 
The second reason explaining slow convergence concerns the peculiar role of the 
agricultural sector as an "employer of last resort". In some countries, particularly those 
where employment in agriculture was initially high, the collapse of regular employment has 
led to a reversion to small-scale farming. There is thus a perverse tendency for those 
countries that had the greatest surplus of employment in agriculture in 1989 to experience 
the slowest declines (Bulgaria), or even in the case of Romania, a sharp increase in 
agricultural employment between 1989 and 1997 from 3,056 thousands to 3,384 thousands. 
                                                          
41 Langewiesche,Renate EU enlargement and the free movement of labor WIIW working paper, 1999 
 33
 Winners and losers in the process of European integration. A look at Romania                               
Romania is in fact the only country in the panel, Eastern or Western, where the workforce in 
agriculture increased; the numbers peaked in 1995-96.  
 
The so-called reverse migration, from urban to rural, typical in times of crisis, has hit 
Romania severely. In the first 7 years of transition, the percentage of reverse migration in 
total domestic migration has increased seven times (see table 1, annex E). The reverse 
migration has been experienced mostly by poorest counties - the Botosani county, with the 
lowest value of the development index, received almost entire immigration from counties at 
the other end of the development axis (see table 2, annex E.). Such already poor counties, 
that received additional labor supply in the context of limited and decreasing labor demand, 
can easily be identified as losers. It is difficult to estimate whether they are losers of 
integration, or simply losers of transition. The only way to say it is to identify the specific 
sectors where the components of reverse migration flows were previously employed, but the 
data are not available in this respect. According to Sandu42, young and relatively skilled 
people predominate in the reverse migration flows, a conclusion that contradicts a foreign 
study43 stating that the flow of Romanian emigration towards EU consists largely of 
young and relatively high-skilled people who were previously employed back home. 
Therefore, we are prudent in labeling as winners or losers specific age groups of 
population – what we can say about young and relatively skilled people is that they are 
the most mobile part of population (see also table 3, annex E). 
 
A large agricultural sector in terms of employment suggests the existence of a two tier 
system consisting, first, of large numbers of people involved in low productivity, small 
farming, subsistence agriculture, coexisting together with large, potentially profitable, but in 
practice still state-owned and unreformed, groups of farms. The question we have to ask here 
is whether all these small, privately owned farms could survive or will die–with daring social 
and economic implications- in the competitive environment of the EU and CEFTA, where 
agriculture, and exports of agricultural products, are heavily subsidised through the Common 
Agricultural Policy for the former, or the governments for the latter. Illustrative in this sense 
is the example of Poland, a country with a large inherited agricultural sector (27% of 
employment in 1989) where employment in agriculture declined by almost one million and a 
half people between 1989 and 1997 (reaching a share of 20.5%). In Romania, 46% of 
population lives in the rural area, yet agriculture fails to produce more than one fifth of the 
GDP, while contributing with less than 3% to total exports. 
 
Third, and most important, a significant part of the change in the employment structure that 
has been observed has not been attributable to the reallocation of labor across sectors, but 
simply reflects the uneven incidence of macroeconomic recession and sectoral shocks. In 
Romania, for example, the share of employment in utilities such as electricity and water has 
risen even though the initial shares in these sectors were already too high, presumably 
because they are less vulnerable to recession. At the same time the share of employment in 
manufacturing severely declined from 33% to 22%, mainly in the light, non-unionized 
branches such as textiles and clothing (Pauna C. and Pauna B., 1999). 1997, the year where 
                                                          
42 Sandu,Dumitru Social space of transition, 2000 
43 Langewiesche,Renate and Lubyova,Martina op.cit 
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this reallocation analysis stops, was indeed the year that recorded the lowest ratio of 
employees in textiles and footwear sectors in total industry employees, as figure 7 also 
proves. What has happened after 1997 was the sharp rise in the relative number of 
employees in these sectors, with the subsequent increase in unit labor costs and 
continuous decrease in comparative advantages. The lower than industry average 
wages, with productivity lagging even lower behind industry average, might indicate 
that, taking textiles as an example, when occurring, restructuring has not taken place 
as it should have. 
 
Some further evidence for the uneven nature of the shock suffered by CEE countries (given 
in table 4, annex E) shows gross changes of employment by sector between 1989 and 1997 
in absolute figures. Between 1989 and 1997 the rate of net job destruction in the sectors that 
declined in terms of workforce ranged from 28.0% of the initial level of employment in 
Poland to 17.1% in the Czech Republic, while net job creation in the sectors ranged from 
8.2% in Poland to only 0.6% in Bulgaria. There is a clear inverse relationship between job 
destruction and job creation, consistent with the dominant role of aggregate shocks relative 
to sectoral reallocation. It is notable that in most cases even where the share of employment 
in a particular sector is rising, the absolute level of employment in that sector is falling. Such 
changes in the structure of employment that took place between 1989 and 1997 could thus 
have been achieved almost entirely by differential rates of job loss with no labor mobility at 
all across sectors. The fact that there was a net job destruction might seem to contradict the 
rapid growth of some CEE countries, such as Poland and Hungary; on the other hand, one 
can argue that it has provided the conditions for the economy to develop on new grounds, to 
gradually create jobs, and to work efficiently. 
 
Table 4 in annex E provides a good image about the size of job destruction and job 
creation in Romania. It shows that during the period of investigation employment shrunk 
by almost 2 million jobs, a figure exceeded only by Poland, with 2.7 million, but also 
with a significantly larger labor force. Furthermore, net job destruction in the sectors 
where the overall employment declined was around 2.6 million job cuts, or around 
24% of the initial employment level in those sectors. To put it in other words, in the 
declining industrial sectors, preponderantly in manufacturing, but also in constructions 
and transportation, one in four workers employed in 1989 lost his job by the end of 1997. 
At the same time, new job creation in the growing sectors was during the same period of 
around seven hundred thousand workplaces, or 6.4% of the 1989 employment level. 
Almost half of these jobs are in agriculture, the “employer of last resort”, and presumably 
in subsistence agriculture, but also a significant rise took place in trade, and to some 
extent in utilities (still state-owned or controlled monopolies) and the financial sector.  
 
The fact that the gap in the structures of production has actually widened over the first 
eight years of transition is aggravated by the low scale of job creation. This seems to 
reflect not the restructuring process in the economy, but precisely the opposite of it, the 
lack of adequate restructuring.  
 
The problem with losers is that they are actually losers-to-be, stucked in sectors that still 
need restructuring. Some of the workers understand this, and are already tired of a decade 
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in which they have been considered as losers, without being officially declared as such. 
This decade of stress over their jobs has not only affected their efficiency at work, but 
also has postponed the reconversion process. Unemployment figures for 2000 show again 
the delay in restructuring, with slightly over 10% unemployment rate at the end of the 
year, as compared to a target of 13% set at the beggining of last year.  
 
The remaining part of the workers, as well as a part of the private owners, are tempted to 
look only at their short-term positions on the winner/loser axe. How shall we count a 
female worker in a poor town, employed in a small textile factory, and getting paid with 
50USD/month? She might be tempted to count herself as a winner - after all, she has a 
job, and she comes home with some money that are not negligible in a poor town. Even 
her employer might count her as a winner - after all, he picked her out of a line of people 
in need of a job. Meanwhile, we might be tempted to count her as loser - her job has little 
future, her health could fastly ruin, the wage is two times and a half below the industry 
average, and, in case she would like to leave, she is probably not lucky enough to have an 
alternative.  
 
4.2. Taking sides: can our losers change their team? 
 
From the outset, labor market policy in the transition economies has been based on the 
recognition of the need for substantial reallocation of labor across sectors. It was thought 
that employment restructuring might lead to high albeit temporary unemployment 
(Blanchard and Aghion, 1992), because the speed of job loss in declining sectors could 
be very much more rapid than the rate of new job creation in the growing sectors and on 
account of obstacles to labor mobility. In this framework, the key elements of labor 
market policy were seen to be:  
- subjecting firms to hard budget constraints to force rapid restructuring; 
- encouraging labor mobility and flexibility; 
- provision of benefits, or some form of “social safety net”, for those temporarily 
stranded between the collapse of jobs in the state sector and the growth of the private 
sector;  
- encouraging transitions out of the labor force, eventually through generous retirement 
and early retirement programs. 
 
The evidence presented in the previous section argues that some of these policies may 
have been inappropriate. Whether or not unemployment is economically efficient 
depends on the opportunity cost of those retained in employment which, given the very 
low outflow from unemployment, may be close to zero. The belief that unemployment is 
efficient in the particular circumstances of the transition, because it would facilitate the 
movement of workers into growth sectors, is disputable - private firms appear to recruit 
those with jobs in the state sector or new entrants to the labour force rather than from the 
unemployed. This comes to support the idea that the boom and bust cycle needs to be 
avoided, and sustainable growth, including job creation, be achieved. Evidence suggests 
(Earle and Pauna, 1998) that most of the workers displaced from the declining sectors, 
like in Romania, and pushed into unemployment tend to become long-term unemployed 
and discouraged, with very little chance of re-entering workforce. 
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Thus the objective of policy should be (or should have been) to try to balance the growth 
of jobs in the private sector with the decline in employment in the state sector, by 
encouraging the former, particularly in the growing sectors, and restraining the latter. 
This does not imply a policy of indefinite and indiscriminate support for maintaining 
employment in declining firms, but rather an attempt to equate the private social costs of 
layoffs. One extreme would be simply to abolish unemployment benefits, as is 
approximately the case of Russia. But the Czech approach, of limiting and restricting 
availability of benefits in conjunction with selective support of state firms, seems a more 
attractive model for Romania, as a transition country. 
The immediate problem in the CEE countries, Romania included, however concerns the 
long-term unemployment of displaced workers. The danger here is that given the 
mismatch between the skills of the unemployed, usually characterized by a high degree 
of specificity, and the shifts in the demand for labor, many unemployed coming from the 
declining industrial enterprises will have very little chances in finding jobs. Tighter 
controls on, and lower levels of, benefits may help reduce the flow into unemployment 
but will not themselves create more jobs for the unemployed. Only to the extent that such 
policies reduce the general level of wages, or can be made part of a package reducing 
taxes on employment, will they assist in the creation of new jobs. Such effects seem 
unlikely to be sufficiently large to have a major impact on the problem. 
 
Looking further into the nature of unemployment in Romania and other transition 
economies, it is notable that both the eligibility and the duration of unemployment 
benefits are limited, yet many people seem able to support themselves for long period of 
unemployment44. Clearly, it is possible that many of those registered as, or reporting 
themselves, unemployed may also have some form of casual or informal work, given in 
particular that many of the East European countries have sizable agricultural sectors, like 
Romania, and some also have thriving informal sectors. There has been widespread 
concern, not least in the countries themselves, about abuse of the benefit system, though 
there is little hard evidence45. Unemployment is thus becoming linked to the growth of 
the (non-taxpaying) shadow economy. 
 
The transition economies, and Romania among them, typically have both high benefits, 
albeit with restricted coverage, and high employment taxes, which together create strong 
incentive for evasion. This suggest a possible new role for active labor market policies: 
by linking payment of benefit to some temporary job, like in Britain, the employer is of 
necessity brought into the formal sector. Traditionally, evaluations of active labor market 
policies in CEE countries, as in OECD economies, have tended to be unfavorable, 
reflecting the fact that active policies are designed to overcome impediments to mobility 
usually between similar jobs, when the problem in most CEE countries has been an 
                                                          
44 E.g., in Bulgaria, only 24% of those reported as unemployed in the June 1994 Labour Force Survey were 
receiving unemployment benefits, leaving 550,000 people (over 15% of the labor force) reporting 
themselves as unemployed with no visible income. 
45 However, in Poland, one survey found that 46% of unemployed people had some form of work, albeit 
often only casual or part-time (World Bank, 1995), while a second survey found that around 35% of 
employers were hiring informally people registered as unemployed (Mroczowski, 1996). 
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overall shortage of jobs (OECD, Puhani and Steiner, 1996). The degree of job destruction 
might be high in the EU zone , but at the same time job creation is well above levels in 
CEE countries, which do not seem to be able to absorb the excess labor force released by 
the declining sectors46. 
If active labor policies (retraining, public works, job counseling, etc.) targeting the 
unemployed have been proved to have a limited impact, both in CEE and OECD 
countries, in reducing the level of joblessness, and mainly in stimulating job creation, is 
there anything else that can be done by policy makers? Since the problems of the CEE 
countries are largely structural, and adaptational, and generated by the elimination of the 
institutional framework for which enterprises and workers have been prepared for 
decades, namely the command economy, it might be that the firms and labor market 
participants alone cannot succeed in making a successful adjustment to the fundamentally 
new environment in which they have to survive, which is the free market, competitive 
climate. 
 
Therefore the government, hand in hand with the markets, can remedy these structural 
deficiencies and address areas where the market mechanisms alone fail to provide the 
conditions necessary for successful adjustment. We do not advocate here for an 
interventionist policy overruling the market forces, but for selectivity and 
complementarity, where the main role of the authority would be to enhance the growth of 
rising industries, in order to replace those that are in decline, and to provide loser 
workers, as well as the losers-to-be, with the chance to rellocate towards winning sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 These evaluations have, however, been concerned with the future job prospects of participants rather 
than with the growth of the shadow economy. A gradual introduction of Swedish style active labor 
policies, say in terms of providing a temporary job or training after six moths unemployment of those 
under 25, as a condition for continued receipt of benefit could have an important role in retaining people in 
the official labour market, and discouraging the growth of the shadow economy. 
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5. Conclusions and policy recommendation 
 
Most of the conclusions have already been stated in the previous sections of our work, 
some others might seem trivial, and some might have escaped to our attention; yet, we try 
to provide a number of clear-shot conclusions.  
 
According to results of the opinion poll, the majority of population actively supports the 
integration, while only 4.7% define both themselves and the country as losers. However, 
the economic and social reality does not support this overwhelming positive attitude. 
There are at least three common-sense reasons to explain the discrepancies between 
individual perceptions and holistic realities: 
• insufficient information. Our paper is an attempt to provide an objective, fact-
based, assesment, understanding and interpretation of the impact of European integration 
upon the Romanian society. 
• the false impression that integration is a remote target that, when reached, will 
automatically bring welfare surpluses to the society. Integration has already started, and 
someone wins and somebody else loses just as we write – integration is a process. We 
have tried to analyze this process both ex ante (convergence towards working 
structures) and ex post (trade facts). It is higly important to become aware of the 
winners and losers positions, and to understand that these positions are not immutable 
and that they depend on governments’ policies.  
• when a sector of activity, or a group of working people, wins or loses, it does 
not necessarily mean that the group tendency is valid for every individual in that group. 
Even overenthusiastic as it is, the opinion poll shows us, by aggregating scores, that 
24.2% of population considers itself as losers, while other 20.6% doesn’t have an 
opinion. 
 
We have identified winners, among which:  
- exporters of wooden products; 
- developers of new high-tech technologies (at this moment, they are not significant, 
and the spreading-out effect is low); 
- people working in services (however, privatization in tourism, for example, is still to 
take place, with implications on the number of employees).  
 
A mixed story can be told regarding textiles and footwear. They are still on the winning 
side, but they are constantly diminishing their competitive advantage, as employment in 
these sectors has grown, but with wages way below industry average, productivity 
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lagging even further behind industry average. As most activities in these sectors are 
developed in lohn (being relatively unskilled labor-intensive and low value-adding), the 
fact that the unit labor cost constantly exceeds the industry average threatens to 
further decrease their comparative advantage. 
 
 
 
At the same time, we have identified clear losers:  
- the chemical sector  
- the mining sector; 
- exporters of furniture; 
- people who returned to agriculture as an employer of last resort. 
 
These situations must be taken neither as granted, nor as desirable. The fact that furniture 
is on the losing side, while raw wooden products are on the winning side, should be 
addressed and reversed (a recent measure of the Government acts in this direction, 
although the method might be disputable, namely the interdiction to export logs). This 
problem could be addressed on the demand-side as well, by temporarily limiting final 
(non-productive inputs) imports of furniture, at least for state-owned entities. 
 
The people who returned to agriculture as an employer of last resort must be offered 
alternatives, by promoting active labor policies. Otherwise, they are going to be long 
term losers, as agriculture will increasingly face challenges due to trade openess with 
partners, mainly the EU members and the CEFTA front runners, which heavily subsidize 
their agriculture. 
 
There are a number of sectors with losing potential, as they are at disadvantage within 
CEFTA, yet relatively neutral with respect to EU: plastics, rubber, leather, paper, glass, 
ceramics, optical and medical instruments. When CEFTA front runners join EU 
(inevitably prior to Romania), two major consequences will appear for Romania:  
- the disadvantages (that have became of a chronic nature) with CEFTA will be 
transferred into disadvantages with EU;  
- potential trade will be diverted from EU-15 in favor of newcomers.  
 
This warning is also valid for agriculture, a highly sensitive sector. We recommend that, 
in such a context, the Romanian authorities should acknowledge the reality that 
some other CEFTA countries will join the EU ahead of us, and they should become 
aware of what this paper signals. Consequently, within the accession negotiations, 
regarding the above mentioned sectors (including agriculture), Romania should review 
its bargaining position and possibly demand further temporary exemptions, plus 
measures to avoid potential trade diversion. 
 
Another sector where Romania should try to bargain with the EU is metalurgy. Our 
analysis shows that a winning potential might exist in this area, but it might be inhibited 
by trade restrictions imposed by the EU in order to protect its own industry. 
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When we discuss about loser sectors, it does not mean that Romania should necessarily 
abandon them, as they seem to be inefficient. When we discuss about winners, it does not 
mean that they they will maintain their position unconditionally. In both cases, and 
most of all in cases without a clear call, but with identified potential toward losing 
or winning, there is a need for public policy as industrial policy47 pursued with the 
strategic goal to escape the low development traps and promote high value-added 
activities. 
Based on its labor-intensive feature, the Romanian economy has became a net 
exporter of workforce and a carrier of the subcontracting culture at home.  
 
Even the growth of the so-called technology intensive group is due to labor intensive 
products, as we produce and export parts and components for machines and equipments, 
rather than machines and equipments. Romania seems to preserve an old structure of 
production, which, taken in conjenction with the low ratios of saving and investment 
in the economy, show not only the little renewal efforts that take place, but also the 
low ability of the economy, by itself, to develop such renewal efforts. Therefore, once 
again, public policy is neededin order to enhance higher saving and investment ratio, and 
favor high value-added sectors. 
 
This would actually be the very first policy recommendation - namely, that a policy 
must exist, to promote industrial modernization while supporting labor reallocation, 
with the ultimate goal in mind to create new structures of production that allow for 
high vallue added products to be produced, and for the income gap with the EU 
countries to be reduced.  
 
This public policy must be selective in its intervention, but global in its approach.  
 
For example, specific legislation must be passed in order to protect the rights of so 
many Romanian companies acting as subcontractors. However, legislative measures 
by themselves do not solve the problem. At the same time, efforts must be focused 
on enhancing investment in research and development, education and skill 
formation, so that our industry could graduate out of the subcontracting culture. In 
addition, fiscal policies might be designed to encourage companies to increase the 
share of value-added that is locally incorporated in their products.  
 
Commercial policy is less efficient in the context in which the current average industrial 
tariffs with the EU is 5.5%. Commercial policies is nowadays rather a last resort 
mechanism to temporary redress imbalances, by introducing derogations,and 
salvgardory measures. They are needed, as we have argued in case of some sectors -
agriculture included- that face potential losses when the enlargement of the EU will take 
place without Romania. However, they must be complemented by industrial, labor, 
legislative and fiscal components of a public policy designed at the national level. 
 
                                                          
47 See Daianu, Daniel South-Eastern Europe revisited. Can economic decline be stopped? p.22-24, 
Institute for Security Studies, occasional papers no.21/2000.  
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6. Suggestions for further research 
 
The intention of this study has been to stimulate the debate on various issues of economic 
integration with the EU. It would have been beyond our ability to provide thorough 
answers to the few questions we addressed, in view of the available time and resources. 
Much remains to be done and this study is only a step forward.  We very much hope that 
the research on this topic will continue48. 
 
Further research is definitely neededin directions such as: 
- an in depth analysis (sectoral studies) of the challenges faced by sectors with losing 
potential: agriculture, rubber, plastics, leather, paper, glass, ceramics, optical and 
medical instruments; 
- identifying alternatives for losers of integration, be they sectors, groups or regions; 
- the social impact of convergence towards EU structures; 
- the impact of subcontracting on the development potential of local companies 
                                                          
48 Particularly now, when another EU-focused think tank, the European Institute, has started its operations 
in full gears. 
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Annex A. 
Revealed comparative advantages of Romania with EU and with the rest of the world, 
1991-2000 
 
RCAT – total trade RCA 
RCAUE – Romania’s RCA with UE 
RCAR – Romania’s RCA with the rest of the world 
1-20 groups of goods as shown in official statistics 
 
Obs (groups 1-22) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
    
RCAT_1 1.56 1.09 1.15 0.94 0.54 1.09 1.41 -0.44 0.14 0.13 
RCAUE_1 -1.73 0.65 0.57 0.58 0.40 0.61 0.93 -0.08 0.46 0.41 
RCA_R_1 3.83 1.39 1.35 1.07 0.65 1.53 1.74 -0.66 -0.09 -0.08 
    
RCAT_2 -1.36 -1.83 -1.82 -0.64 0.57 1.16 0.26 0.13 0.31 -0.81 
RCAUE_2 -1.44 -1.40 -1.66 0.13 0.60 0.23 0.40 0.33 0.76 -0.29 
RCA_R_2 -1.41 -2.37 -2.01 -1.37 0.61 1.49 0.25 0.18 0.18 -1.02 
    
 -0.59 -1.32 1.27 0.51 1.18 1.40 1.63 0.58 0.72 0.10 
RCAUE_3 -0.66 -1.00 0.38 -1.62 -0.37 -1.60 -2.32 -2.19 -0.90 -3.15 
RCA_R_3 -3.48 -2.46 1.93 1.23 2.25 3.19 3.03 1.52 1.60 1.13 
    
RCAT_4 -1.99 -1.90 -1.86 -1.61 -1.83 -1.37 -1.10 -1.40 -1.68 -1.76 
RCAUE_4 -1.75 -1.13 -1.22 -1.36 -1.60 -1.26 -1.15 -1.63 -1.57 -1.56 
RCA_R_4 -2.44 -2.51 -2.40 -1.80 -2.03 -1.42 -1.03 -1.15 -1.69 -1.79 
    
RCAT_5 -1.85 -0.88 -0.89 -0.84 -0.96 -1.01 -1.04 -0.85 -0.71 -0.68 
RCAUE_5 0.47 0.23 0.87 0.90 -0.07 -0.04 -0.53 -0.08 -0.45 -1.02 
RCA_R_5     NA    -1.21 -1.37 -1.11 -1.03 -1.14 -1.02 -0.82 -0.61 -0.51 
    
RCAT_6 0.70 0.34 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.23 -0.76 -0.89 -0.56 
RCAUE_6 -1.05 -0.54 -0.96 -0.69 -0.81 -0.95 -1.12 -1.56 -1.92 -1.61 
RCA_R_6 1.37 0.83 0.37 0.52 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.03 0.00 0.31 
    
RCAT_7 -0.07 -0.42 -0.63 -0.32 -0.40 -0.50 -0.58 -0.72 -0.76 -0.61 
RCAUE_7 -0.68 -0.30 -0.66 -0.65 -0.38 -0.54 -1.00 -0.71 -0.92 -0.74 
RCA_R_7 0.36 -0.49 -0.59 0.00 -0.42 -0.45 0.29 -0.75 -0.50 -0.39 
    
RCAT_8 0.64 -0.81 -0.89 -0.84 -1.13 -1.25 -1.15 -1.24 -1.34 -1.21 
RCAUE_8 0.72 -0.62 -0.75 -0.94 -1.33 -1.52 -1.46 -1.45 -1.50 -1.40 
RCA_R_8 0.60 -0.96 -1.08 -0.53 -0.29 -0.19 0.04 -0.21 -0.29 0.01 
    
RCAT_9 1.49 1.87 2.05 2.26 1.79 2.09 2.14 2.23 2.18 2.17 
RCAUE_9 0.86 1.48 1.17 1.27 0.87 1.28 1.34 1.81 1.93 1.90 
RCA_R_9 1.91 2.24 2.71 3.14 2.84 2.79 2.87 2.65 2.49 2.47 
    
RCAT_10 -0.27 -1.35 -1.33 -1.24 -0.75 -1.21 -1.09 -1.56 -1.51 -1.10 
RCAUE_10 -0.34 -1.42 -1.64 -1.60 -1.25 -1.78 -1.84 -2.13 -2.09 -1.60 
RCA_R_10 -0.44 -1.24 -1.13 -0.92 -0.28 -0.68 -0.42 -0.99 -0.85 -0.55 
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RCAT_11 0.81 0.11 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.60 0.51 0.52 0.33 0.29 
RCAUE_11 1.43 0.14 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.45 0.30 0.26 
RCA_R_11 0.48 0.26 0.24 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.43 0.38 -0.01 -0.07 
    
RCAT_12 0.94 0.87 1.49 1.68 1.66 1.75 1.54 1.48 1.48 1.38 
RCAUE_12 0.85 0.95 1.82 1.85 1.69 1.73 1.59 1.56 1.51 1.47 
RCA_R_12 0.93 0.90 0.76 0.74 0.89 1.31 0.15 -0.58 0.29 -0.79 
    
RCAT_13 0.28 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.23 0.17 
RCAUE_13 0.05 1.04 0.91 0.63 0.44 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.23 
RCA_R_13 0.37 0.26 0.16 0.44 0.55 0.43 0.34 0.31 0.19 0.06 
    
RCAT_15 1.28 1.32 1.53 1.25 1.22 0.92 1.13 1.05 0.85 0.87 
RCAUE_15 0.74 0.85 0.78 0.80 1.09 0.83 1.04 0.98 0.69 0.83 
RCA_R_15 1.55 1.63 1.92 1.56 1.38 1.03 1.24 1.18 1.07 0.97 
    
RCAT_16 0.21 -0.27 -0.68 -0.88 -0.91 -0.97 -0.97 -0.88 -0.72 -0.59 
RCAUE_16 -1.34 -1.13 -1.43 -1.44 -1.30 -1.21 -1.11 -0.98 -0.77 -0.67 
RCA_R_16 0.86 0.35 0.10 -0.04 -0.33 -0.58 -0.78 -0.75 -0.65 -0.50 
    
RCAT_17 1.54 1.30 0.65 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.23 0.59 0.49 
RCAUE_17 -0.29 -1.04 -0.85 -0.46 -0.22 0.13 -0.23 -0.21 0.60 0.32 
RCA_R_17 2.11     NA    1.41 0.63 0.72 0.64 0.90 0.76 0.63 0.71 
    
RCAT_18 -1.63 -1.46 -2.03 -2.17 -2.39 -2.00 -2.05 -1.64 -1.85 -1.68 
RCAUE_18 -2.53 -1.76 -2.16 -2.33 -2.52 -2.19 -1.96 -1.72 -1.89 -1.61 
RCA_R_18 -1.18 -0.97 -1.59 -1.93 -2.20 -1.67 -2.23 -1.52 -1.78 -1.80 
    
RCAT_20 2.86 2.27 1.94 1.50 1.41 1.35 1.21 1.18 1.10 1.04 
RCAUE_20 2.87 2.59 2.04 1.47 1.42 1.30 1.15 1.12 1.11 1.05 
RCA_R_20 2.55 1.79 1.83 1.60 1.24 1.38 1.26 1.22 0.92 0.84 
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Annex B. 
Revealed comparative advantages of CEFTA countries (minus Romania) with UE, 1999 
 
Groups  
1-22 
% Exp CEFTA % Imp UE RCA CEFTA - UE RCA log
1 1.621 1.729 0.938 -0.064 
2 1.677 3.080 0.545 -0.608 
3 0.048 0.338 0.143 -1.946 
4 1.400 2.592 0.540 -0.616 
5 3.087 11.373 0.271 -1.304 
6 3.017 6.839 0.441 -0.818 
7 4.222 2.782 1.517 0.417 
8 0.644 0.992 0.649 -0.432 
9 3.540 1.596 2.218 0.797 
10 2.075 1.691 1.227 0.204 
11 9.809 7.661 1.280 0.247 
12 1.523 1.172 1.299 0.262 
13 2.367 0.815 2.905 1.066 
14 0.460 3.407 0.135 -2.003 
15 10.830 5.526 1.960 0.673 
16 29.772 28.594 1.041 0.040 
17 15.791 10.423 1.515 0.415 
18 1.238 4.354 0.284 -1.258 
19 0.024 0.097 0.249 -1.392 
20 6.119 2.801 2.185 0.781 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex C. 
Romania’s foreign trade structure, total and with EU, 1991 - 2000 
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PMT – percentage of specific imports in total imports 
PXT – percentage of specific exports in total exports 
PMEU – percentage of specific imports from EU in total imports from EU 
PXEU – percentage of specific exports to EU in total exports to EU 
 
Obs (groups  
1-22) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
     
PMT_1 0.73% 1.42% 1.05% 1.39% 1.25% 0.64% 0.58% 1.76% 1.18% 1.03%
PXT_1 3.47% 4.23% 3.31% 3.56% 2.15% 1.91% 2.36% 1.13% 1.36% 1.17%
PMEU_1 1.80% 0.90% 0.92% 0.89% 0.68% 0.50% 1.07% 0.76% 0.69%
PXUE_1 0.40% 3.46% 1.58% 1.65% 1.33% 1.25% 1.26% 0.99% 1.20% 1.05%
     
PMT_2 6.37% 7.13% 7.28% 1.97% 1.50% 1.46% 1.51% 1.91% 2.15% 2.40%
PXT_2 1.64% 1.14% 1.18% 1.04% 2.64% 4.63% 1.95% 2.18% 2.93% 1.07%
PMEU_2 10.57% 9.20% 9.41% 1.27% 0.67% 0.90% 0.76% 0.81% 0.89% 1.05%
PXUE_2 2.50% 2.26% 1.79% 1.44% 1.22% 1.13% 1.14% 1.14% 1.90% 0.79%
     
PMT_3 0.24% 0.67% 0.36% 0.46% 0.32% 0.21% 0.29% 0.47% 0.31% 0.25%
PXT_3 0.14% 0.18% 1.28% 0.77% 1.03% 0.86% 1.49% 0.84% 0.64% 0.27%
PMEU_3 0.70% 1.26% 0.50% 0.52% 0.43% 0.33% 0.41% 0.45% 0.30% 0.25%
PXUE_3 0.36% 0.46% 0.73% 0.10% 0.29% 0.07% 0.04% 0.05% 0.12% 0.01%
     
PMT_4 6.22% 7.35% 6.13% 5.52% 5.65% 5.29% 3.78% 4.43% 4.01% 3.64%
PXT_4 0.85% 1.10% 0.96% 1.10% 0.91% 1.34% 1.26% 1.10% 0.75% 0.63%
PMEU_4 8.85% 5.72% 4.61% 4.31% 4.55% 3.77% 2.72% 2.91% 2.64% 2.03%
PXUE_4 1.54% 1.85% 1.36% 1.11% 0.92% 1.07% 0.86% 0.57% 0.55% 0.43%
     
PMT_5 45.32% 31.58% 28.70% 26.82% 24.16% 23.51% 21.35% 14.25% 12.05% 14.86%
PXT_5 7.14% 13.10% 11.73% 11.61% 9.24% 8.56% 7.57% 6.11% 5.90% 7.52%
PMEU_5 14.50% 8.97% 4.47% 2.71% 3.78% 4.33% 3.50% 2.19% 1.52% 2.33%
PXUE_5 23.25% 11.24% 10.72% 6.64% 3.53% 4.17% 2.06% 2.02% 0.97% 0.84%
     
PMT_6 7.09% 6.85% 7.84% 7.87% 9.01% 8.63% 8.33% 8.68% 9.38% 8.80%
PXT_6 14.22% 9.65% 7.03% 7.92% 9.13% 8.52% 6.64% 4.05% 3.84% 5.01%
PMEU_6 12.08% 9.22% 9.44% 9.31% 9.96% 9.88% 9.53% 9.51% 10.07% 9.61%
PXUE_6 4.25% 5.35% 3.63% 4.66% 4.43% 3.81% 3.11% 2.00% 1.48% 1.92%
     
PMT_7 1.34% 2.99% 3.13% 3.20% 3.80% 3.91% 3.94% 4.33% 4.59% 4.68%
PXT_7 1.25% 1.96% 1.67% 2.33% 2.55% 2.38% 2.21% 2.10% 2.14% 2.54%
PMEU_7 2.53% 3.33% 3.45% 3.80% 3.94% 4.11% 6.00% 4.32% 4.80% 5.10%
PXUE_7 1.29% 2.46% 1.78% 1.98% 2.69% 2.41% 2.20% 2.13% 1.92% 2.43%
     
PMT_8 0.31% 1.27% 1.75% 2.10% 2.06% 2.30% 2.46% 2.58% 2.91% 3.06%
PXT_8 0.59% 0.57% 0.72% 0.90% 0.66% 0.66% 0.78% 0.75% 0.76% 0.91%
PMEU_8 0.31% 1.99% 2.71% 3.47% 3.67% 3.99% 4.25% 4.21% 4.58% 5.01%
PXUE_8 0.63% 1.07% 1.28% 1.36% 0.97% 0.88% 0.99% 0.99% 1.02% 1.23%
     
PMT_9 0.61% 0.54% 0.46% 0.38% 0.54% 0.45% 0.47% 0.50% 0.66% 0.64%
PXT_9 2.70% 3.55% 3.61% 3.62% 3.26% 3.66% 4.01% 4.64% 5.82% 5.64%
PMEU_9 1.11% 0.77% 0.65% 0.54% 0.80% 0.53% 0.57% 0.44% 0.58% 0.55%
2.25% 
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PXUE_9 2.63% 3.34% 2.07% 1.91% 1.90% 1.92% 2.17% 2.72% 4.03% 3.65%
     
PMT_10 0.67% 1.51% 1.47% 1.90% 2.29% 2.40% 2.26% 2.63% 2.54% 2.35%
PXT_10 0.51% 0.39% 0.39% 0.55% 1.07% 0.71% 0.76% 0.55% 0.56% 0.78%
PMEU_10 1.30% 1.99% 1.57% 2.18% 2.64% 2.69% 2.66% 2.58% 2.66% 2.44%
PXUE_10 0.93% 0.48% 0.30% 0.44% 0.75% 0.45% 0.42% 0.31% 0.33% 0.49%
     
PMT_11 4.24% 9.34% 10.10% 11.40% 11.76% 11.74% 13.87% 15.42% 18.64% 18.40%
PXT_11 9.50% 10.44% 16.04% 18.80% 19.84% 21.44% 23.03% 26.04% 25.83% 24.54%
PMEU_11 3.04% 15.94% 17.14% 20.21% 19.60% 19.33% 22.81% 23.11% 26.56% 26.89%
PXUE_11 12.71% 18.27% 31.05% 33.05% 31.21% 33.42% 36.02% 36.39% 36.01% 34.93%
     
PMT_12 0.78% 0.70% 0.74% 0.94% 1.03% 1.08% 1.39% 1.67% 1.83% 1.99%
PXT_12 2.00% 1.67% 3.27% 5.06% 5.41% 6.25% 6.46% 7.34% 8.03% 7.90%
PMEU_12 1.14% 1.12% 1.04% 1.50% 1.70% 1.84% 2.24% 2.33% 2.60% 2.78%
PXUE_12 2.68% 2.90% 6.44% 9.54% 9.26% 10.32% 11.03% 11.13% 11.80% 12.13%
     
PMT_13 1.38% 1.18% 1.35% 1.29% 1.34% 1.44% 1.27% 1.38% 1.49% 1.36%
PXT_13 1.82% 2.20% 2.24% 2.22% 2.20% 2.07% 1.79% 1.89% 1.87% 1.61%
PMEU_13 2.67% 1.27% 1.18% 1.34% 1.52% 1.55% 1.47% 1.45% 1.40% 1.35%
PXUE_13 2.81% 3.57% 2.93% 2.52% 2.36% 2.11% 2.04% 1.98% 1.83% 1.69%
     
PMT_15 4.18% 4.52% 4.26% 4.95% 5.34% 6.26% 5.94% 6.67% 6.61% 7.06%
PXT_15 15.01% 16.86% 19.60% 17.31% 18.16% 15.69% 18.47% 19.07% 15.41% 16.91%
PMEU_15 5.80% 5.73% 4.77% 5.15% 5.75% 6.47% 5.81% 5.94% 6.08% 5.75%
PXUE_15 12.17% 13.35% 10.36% 11.52% 17.03% 14.79% 16.50% 15.77% 12.10% 13.24%
     
PMT_16 14.48% 15.20% 17.62% 20.41% 20.56% 21.91% 22.99% 23.00% 23.43% 22.13%
PXT_16 17.82% 11.64% 8.97% 8.44% 8.29% 8.32% 8.74% 9.52% 11.38% 12.21%
PMEU_16 24.65% 22.95% 27.17% 32.02% 28.75% 29.28% 26.17% 26.97% 26.38% 26.60%
PXUE_16 6.46% 7.40% 6.52% 7.56% 7.85% 8.74% 8.62% 10.17% 12.17% 13.63%
     
PMT_17 2.43% 2.94% 4.33% 4.67% 3.86% 3.63% 3.40% 4.10% 3.02% 2.95%
PXT_17 11.39% 10.84% 8.27% 6.36% 5.41% 5.45% 5.31% 5.14% 5.48% 4.81%
PMEU_17 3.48% 9.87% 5.95% 3.96% 3.70% 3.21% 3.20% 4.32% 2.52% 2.62%
PXUE_17 2.59% 3.50% 2.54% 2.50% 2.99% 3.66% 2.55% 3.50% 4.61% 3.60%
     
PMT_18 2.40% 1.18% 1.79% 2.26% 2.77% 2.09% 2.30% 2.30% 2.45% 2.21%
PXT_18 0.47% 0.27% 0.23% 0.26% 0.25% 0.28% 0.30% 0.45% 0.39% 0.41%
PMEU_18 3.73% 1.97% 3.07% 3.03% 3.79% 2.87% 2.45% 2.49% 2.50% 2.20%
PXUE_18 0.30% 0.34% 0.36% 0.29% 0.31% 0.32% 0.35% 0.45% 0.38% 0.44%
     
PMT_20 0.54% 0.86% 1.19% 1.58% 1.76% 1.77% 1.85% 1.92% 1.96% 1.89%
PXT_20 9.47% 8.38% 8.22% 7.09% 7.26% 6.83% 6.24% 6.25% 5.91% 5.34%
PMEU_20 1.02% 1.36% 1.87% 2.64% 2.60% 2.56% 2.60% 2.43% 2.41% 2.40%
PXUE_20 18.02% 18.10% 14.36% 11.50% 10.72% 9.35% 8.25% 7.41% 7.35% 6.82%
 
 
Annex D. 
Unit labor costs in selected Romanian economic sectors, 1990 - 1999 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Industrial average 11.02 9.87 9.89 10.40 9.48 9.86
 
9.74 
 
7.79 9.53 10.28
 
Extraction Industry 11.40 12.37 16.96 21.05 19.14 20.44
 
19.50 
 
12.75 17.11 18.72
-coal mining and preparation, 
meralliferrous ore, mining and 
preparation and other extraction 
activities 
36.14 35.46 26.87 30.18 23.31 27.34 26.57 20.77 25.59 33.93
-crude oil and natural gas extraction 3.65 4.50 8.20 11.99 12.17 11.43 10.90 7.41 11.71 12.71
  
Processing industry 11.15 10.68 9.65 9.56 9.08 9.38 9.11 7.46 8.98 9.05
-food and beverages+tabacco 5.15 4.93 5.39 4.80 5.79 5.82 6.21 5.49 5.93 9.46
  
Textile and textile products, ready 
made clothes 
16.01 14.49 16.54 16.55 17.84 16.29 17.59 15.05 18.77 20.50
  
-leather goods and footwear 16.76 15.01 14.26 15.31 18.79 14.46 14.88 14.08 16.53 19.57
-wood working (excl. furniture) 13.71 11.47 11.68 12.48 11.52 11.67 9.71 8.82 10.95 28.50
-pulp, paper and cardboard and 
publishing houses 
12.76 9.60 10.95 8.24 8.66 7.53 6.57 6.57 8.28 21.51
  
-crude oil, coal and nuclear fuel 
processing 
1.62 1.83 2.16 1.88 2.40 2.60 3.10 2.49 3.18 3.71
Chemical, synthetic and artificial 
fibres 
7.66 6.20 6.32 7.60 6.79 6.18 6.80 6.74 7.82 11.90
-rubber and plastic processing 9.28 8.12 9.38 8.42 10.79 9.12 8.66 8.38 9.22 20.79
-other nonmetallic mineral products 14.04 14.49 11.89 15.68 11.82 11.50 10.98 8.42 10.99 18.20
   
Metallurgy 6.56 5.55 5.66 7.50 6.89 6.48 6.65 4.80 6.75 1.82
   
Metallic construction  12.87 14.08 15.64 17.92 8.77 14.83 12.35 11.73 12.14 29.09
   
Machines and equipment 18.77 19.24 17.11 20.64 20.22 19.63 19.67 16.27 19.41 22.06
-electric optical and electronic 
equipments 
12.89 11.40 13.01 6.32 6.72 11.63 8.40 8.25 9.94 18.23
  
Tranaport mean 17.60 12.93 12.84 17.45 14.95 15.50 13.03 11.95 11.99 17.53
  
Other industrial activities 23.05 18.87 18.30 19.63 12.94 15.30 14.32 12.89 13.20 27.17
  
Electrical and thermal energy, gas and 
water 
8.24 7.24 6.86 10.25 6.62 7.12 8.40 6.83 8.96 16.42
-production, distribution and transport 
of electric, thermal energy, gas and hot 
water 
7.01 6.44 6.36 9.90 6.16 6.66 7.48 6.20 8.27 14.96
-water collection, treatment and 
distribution 
34.93 24.07 15.52 14.07 12.74 12.71 18.20 14.16 15.26 27.14
Annex E. 
Specific aspects of labor migration in Romania 
 
Table 1. Incidence of urban-rural and rural-urban migration in total migration flows (%) 
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 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Urban-
rural 
3,5 10,1 13,7 14,6 18,4 20,8 23,4 
Rural-
urban 
69,8 50,3 39,2 35,0 30,5 25,1 24,7 
Source: Sandu, Dumitru, op.cit 
 
 
Table 2. Immigration structure based on the discrepancies between the county of origin 
and the county of settlement, 1995-1996  
County of settlement Immigration structure (%) Development index 
for the county of 
settlement  
(1-least developed) 
 Arrivals 
from more 
developed 
counties 
Arrivals 
from rather 
similar 
counties 
Arrivals from 
less 
developed 
counties 
 
Botosani 96,2 3,8 0 1 
Vaslui 96,5 3,5 0 2 
Teleorman 82,3 17,7 0 3 
Giurgiu 73,7 26,3 0 4 
Calarasi 66,8 33,2 0 5 
Neamt 66,2 27,0 6,7 6 
Ialomita 64,3 31,9 3,8 7 
Suceava 55,8 22,1 22,2 8 
Olt 51,8 38,0 10,1 9 
Buzau 67,9 27,3 4,8 10 
Source: Sandu,Dumitru , op.cit 
 
Table 3. Occupational status, comparison 1990-2000 
Occupational status 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+ 
% employed with work contract  before 1990 50.3 86 84.5 69.6 22 - 
% employed with work contract in 2000 36.6 60.7 60 43.7 4.9 - 
2000 - 1990 - 13.7 - 25 - 24.5 - 26 -17 - 
 
% retired before 1990 1.9 2.6 3.6 20.4 63.1 - 
% retired in 2000 1.4 3.5 8 26.1 83.3 93.6 
2000 - 1990 - 0.5 + 0.9 + 4.4 + 5.6 + 20 - 
Data: OSF Public Opinion Barometer, “Social Structure and Ways of Life” 2000,  
Table 4.Change in employment (mil.) 1989-1997. 
 
Sector Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia South OECD 
Agriculture -0.037 -0.346 -0.532 -1.44 0.328 -0.156 -1.498 
Mining -0.019 -0.108 -0.073 -0.19 -0.075 0.012 -0.148 
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Manufacturing -0.753 -0.466 -0.544 -0.991 -1.534 -0.228 -0.813 
Electricity -0.001 0.014 -0.033 0.091 0.054 0.014 -0.029 
Construction -0.176 0.088 -0.126 -1.221 -0.328 -0.094 -0.078 
Trade 0.001 0.205 0.063 0.687 0.283 0.037 0.411 
Transport -0.044 0.032 -0.07 -0.286 -0.252 0.001 -0.025 
Finance 0.024 0.072 0.045 0.14 0.038 0.022 1.331 
Community service -0.089 0.075 -0.012 0.485 -0.436 0.088 0.438 
Total change -1.094 -0.434 -1.282 -2.725 -1.922 -0.304 -0.411 
Job creation 0.025 0.486 0.108 1.403 0.703 0.174 2.18 
[ % ] 0.58 9.04 2.18 8.25 6.42 6.97 5.30 
Job destruction -1.119 -0.92 -1.39 -4.128 -2.625 -0.478 -2.591 
[ % ] -26.07 -17.11 -28.07 -24.28 -23.98 -19.14 -6.30 
Source: computations based on ILO Yearbook of Statistics 1998 
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